


JPRS-UWC-87-003  
9 DECEMBER 1987



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***THE WORKING CLASS & THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD***

No 4, July-August 1987

19980714 154

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# **Soviet Union**

## **The Working Class & The Contemporary World**

No 4, July-August 1987

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### Capitalist Contradictions, 'Third World' Exploitation Noted

18070012b Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I  
SOVREMENNYI MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87  
(signed to press 9 Jul 87) pp 17-32

[Article by T. T. Timofeyev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute: "The Post-October Era and the Contradictions of Capitalism"]

[Excerpts] In the seven decades since October 1917 the struggle in the international arena between the working class and its allies and imperialism and between the devotees of scientific socialism and the apologists for the capitalist system has intensified. The victory of the October Revolution and its consequences changed fundamentally the conditions and dimensions of this struggle; telling new blows at the positions of imperialism were struck by revolutionary processes and transformations in a number of countries in the postwar period.

Many cardinal socioeconomic and ideological-political changes in the world came about as the natural result of the revolutionary changes which had been initiated by the Great October. In connection with the 70th anniversary of this historic event the CPSU Central Committee issued the Appeal to the Soviet People, which says that we are living "in a world which has changed profoundly under the impact of our revolution. Over one-third of mankind has already cast off the shackles of capitalist exploitation. Socialism lives, is developing and is strengthening as a world system. Colonial empires are no more—there are dozens of young sovereign states. The forces of the international proletariat, whose interests are expressed by Marxist-Leninist communist and workers parties, have multiplied. Mass democratic, anti-imperialist and antiwar movements are developing. The general crisis of capitalism is intensifying" (1).

Modern history is developing under the influence of various groups of contradictions, primarily the antagonism between the socialist world and capitalism, the intensification of the antagonisms between labor and capital and between the peoples of the developing countries and imperialism and the increase in interimperialist discord; contradictions between imperialism and the forces of peace, which have intensified in the nuclear era.

The era begun by the Great October is characterized by the growth of the role of the broad working masses. The leading force in the struggle for social progress and peace is the working class and its organizations operating under conditions of the exacerbation of the fundamental contradictions of world capitalism and the intensification of its general crisis. The real dialectics of social development in our time are expressed, as the Lenin Party observes, in a "combination of the competition and confrontation of the two systems and the growing trend toward the interdependence of states and the world

community.... It is thus, via a struggle of opposites, and with difficulty, gropingly to a certain extent, as it were, that the contradictory, but *interdependent, largely integral world* is taking shape" (2).

Bourgeois ideologists have expended much effort in attempts to prove that in our era the working class is being "eroded" and that its role in social and historical development is on the decline. Such assertions are, however, without serious foundation. The expansion of the ranks of the worldwide army of labor and the growth of the assertiveness of its various detachments have become important prerequisites for the working class' successful accomplishment of its historical mission.

Contrary to the prophesies of the anti-Marxists concerning the "abatement" of the class struggle, the confrontation of labor and capital since the Great October has risen in the capitalist world to a higher level. The very existence and the achievements of the country of soviets and subsequently the community of socialist countries, determining in no small measure the prospects of the solution of many acute national and international problems, influence and have influenced most strongly the conditions of the class confrontation in the capitalist system, which, going in the post-October era through various phases, has known both upturns and declines. But as a whole the world revolutionary process has continued to develop in breadth and in depth (4).

The internal antagonisms of imperialism, including the contradictions of capitalist reproduction, have intensified considerably. Bourgeois authors many times gave assurances that capitalism was capable of "sparing itself" economic and social antagonisms. But there subsequently came to be a more sober approach in certain bourgeois circles, to which the intensified crisis phenomena in the capitalist economy and their consequences contributed. In time, particularly as of the mid-1970's and in the 1980's, the myth of the "harmonious" development of capitalism and the smoothing over on this basis of class antagonisms became increasingly apparent. The continued exacerbation of the contradictions of the exploiter system under the conditions of the S&T revolution, the expansion of the scale of unemployment, which has continued even in periods of changes in economic conditions, the assumption of office in a number of capitalist countries of rightwing-conservative governments, their offensive against the rights and living standard of the working people—such are the realities of the present-day capitalist world.

The ideologists of the monopolies are endeavoring to rely in the struggle against the workers movement on erroneously interpreted consequences of the S&T revolution. They are maintaining that the "computer revolution" is contributing to an intensification of individualist principles in society" and that the workers movement is thereby inevitably weakening (5). Anti-Marxists frequently speculate on the fact that appreciable changes are occurring under the conditions of the

S&T revolution in the structure of the proletariat, primarily changes in its professional-skills composition and cultural-educational level. Assertions of bourgeois propagandists concerning "deproletarianization" which is allegedly taking place currently are based on this. However, statistical data testify that what is happening in practice is not a reduction in the ranks of the working class but its further development.

It is precisely in recent decades that a trend toward the conversion of the majority of the population into wage workers has been manifested with new strength in imperialist countries. Their relative significance in the gainfully employed population of the developed capitalist countries grew from 69.1 percent at the start of the 1950's to 81.8 percent at the start of the 1980's, and in some of them has exceeded 90 percent or was very close to this mark (the United States, Britain, Canada). Simultaneously there has been a decline in the proportion of proprietors. Thus in the FRG, where in the 30 years the percentage of wage workers in the gainfully employed population rose from 70.8 to 86.9 percent, the number of proprietors and family members assisting them declined by almost 3 million, and their share of the gainfully employed population declined more than twofold (6).

The core of these changes in the social structure of the said countries is the absolute and relative growth of the ranks of the working class. It has been the result of the proletarianization of significant categories of wage workers of mental labor; the latter is assuming an increasingly clearly expressed industrial nature. These changes in the intrinsic composition of the working class of industrially developed capitalist countries are the consequences of the S&T revolution, which has brought about appreciable structural changes in the economy of the capitalist world.

The industrial proletariat pertains, as before, among the biggest and most populous detachments of the working class; its numbers are continuing to grow, although its relative significance in a number of countries has declined. Consequences of structural changes connected primarily with the growth of science-intensive spheres of production have been reflected here. In addition, the S&T revolution has imparted strong impetus to the development of the sectors of the economy which serve the population's growing nonmaterial requirements. The continued intellectualization of labor and the enhancement of the role in production of informative and managerial functions pertain among the factors which have sharply accelerated the growth of new detachments of the working class. True, as a result of the cyclical crises of the 1970's-1980's employment in this sphere is no longer growing at the former pace, to which the accelerated mechanization of nonphysical labor is contributing. Labor productivity in agriculture grew sharply throughout the 1950's-1970's. As a result the number of workers employed therein declined in the FRG fivefold, in France, more than threefold, in Italy and Great Britain,

more than twofold, and so forth. In the zone of developed capitalism the numbers of the working class from the start of the 1950's through the start of the 1980's increased as a whole by approximately 100 million.

The above-mentioned changes, particularly the industrialization of nonindustrial spheres of the economy, are contributing to a convergence of the interests of the industrial proletariat and the strata of the working class in production which are connected with intellectual labor. The S&T revolution is leading not to the "erosion" of the proletariat but to the greater diversity of its production functions and the cultural and intellectual growth of broad strata of workers. The labor of significant numbers of office workers, among whom differentiation has intensified, has become close in terms of type to that of workers. This applies also to a considerable extent to the professionals, who are becoming a mass social stratum. Differentiation among the S&T professionals, the bulk of whom are being rapidly proletarianized, is particularly profound; in terms of work conditions and social position they are converging with the working class and feeling increasingly the grim social disasters which capitalism entails. Such is the basis of the growing support by engineering-technical personnel, as, equally, office workers, for the demands of the industrial proletariat; they are frequently joint participants in various anti-imperialist actions.

The policy adopted by big capital of the "rationalization" of production based on retooling, the application by governments of a number of countries of "austerity" measures and new forms of state regulation of the economy, the policy of "social revanche" and the granting to the monopolies significant financial and other benefits have contributed to a deterioration in the working people's position.

Contrary to the hopes of the anti-Marxists, the strategy of state-monopoly capitalism has not led to the "abatement" of class conflicts. The overall number of participants therein has continued to increase. Thus whereas in the 5-year period from 1975 through 1979 in the zone of developed capitalism alone approximately 282 million persons took part in strikes and various political protests, 335 million participated in the subsequent 5-year period from 1980 through 1984. If, however, the economic and sociopolitical protests are examined separately, it transpires that their dynamics differ: whereas the number of participants in the latter in the said periods grew appreciably—from 155 to 221 million—the number of participants in strikes caused by economic motives declined from 127 to 114 million (7). The lessening of strike activity in this sphere is explained by a number of factors, among which a principal one is the sharp increase in unemployment. Fearful of being thrown onto the street, workers have not been that disposed toward strikes, and the leaders of the reformist unions have been less inclined than usual to go as far as

a work stoppage. Although the said trend is apparent, it is far from rectilinear—more or less appreciable fluctuations in this direction or the other have been observed in individual years.

Under the conditions of exacerbation of the unemployment problem the working class frequently employs short-term stoppages of the production process (in this case the risk of dismissal of the participants in such protests is relatively small). Strikes confined to enterprises' "weak points" (precise organization and discipline are particularly important here) are spreading also. Strikes involving the occupation of the enterprise have become a prevalent form of class struggle; in a number of cases work continues there following the occupation.

A notable phenomenon of recent years has been the intensification of the class assertiveness of the working people employed in key sectors of the industry of capitalist countries. The working class is repulsing the attempts of state-monopoly circles to shift onto it the brunt of the difficulties of capitalist reproduction.

Under the conditions of the bourgeois system the growth of the internationalization of the productive forces is assuming a contradictory nature. It is being accompanied by the seizure of control by the biggest TNC of sectors of the industry and infrastructure of many countries, the deformation of their economic development and a breakup of the evolved economic mechanism. The TNC are implementing an avowedly antiworker policy, creating pseudo-unions, which are oriented toward "class cooperation," and intensifying the repression in respect of activists of the workers movement. For this reason the strike struggle at TNC enterprises has become an important component of the confrontation of labor and capital.

In the set of contradictions which present-day capitalism is encountering the role of the confrontation between imperialism and the peoples of countries which have thrown off the yoke of colonialism, but which are profoundly economically and, at times, politically dependent on the imperialist powers has grown. "It may be maintained without exaggeration," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress said, "that the system of imperialism is continuing to live to a considerable extent thanks to the plunder of the developing countries.... Taking advantage of the economic and technological dependence and the unequal position of the emergent countries in the world capitalist economy, imperialism is exploiting them mercilessly, exacting a multibillion-dollar tribute which is exhausting these states' economy" (9).

Nor have many other severe consequences of the long colonial domination been overcome. The reasons for this are manifold. The main ones are ultimately the fact that the majority of emergent countries remain, as before, in the world capitalist system, which makes them a target of neocolonial exploitation on the part of the imperialist

powers, predetermines the uneven nature of relations with the latter and impedes the winning not of formal but actual independence and sovereignty.

There has been an intensification in recent years of the crisis of neocolonialism, which has been a consequence of the severe stagnation phenomena in the economy of the Western states. This has entailed a considerable deterioration in the economic position of Asian, African and Latin American countries already weakened in the preceding period by the arrogant lordly dispositions of the imperialists and the latter's long uneven financial-economic exchange with the developing countries. The fact that for some time the place of direct capital investments has to a considerable extent been occupied by foreign bank credit, which has brought about a colossal increase in these countries' foreign debt, has contributed to this. Profound political disagreements dividing the developing countries and the imperialist powers headed by the United States are essential elements of the crisis of neocolonialism. These disagreements concern particularly relations with the socialist countries and questions of war and peace. The developing countries, united in the nonaligned movement, consistently support the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and oppose the danger of nuclear war.

Acute contradictions between the developing countries and the imperialist states are developing also over the demands for the establishment of a new international economic order providing for the elimination of discriminatory measures, which are restricting the appearance of goods from the developing countries on the world market. The narrow framework of domestic demand is becoming increasingly tight for these countries' growing industrial product. It is demanding increasingly insistently a broad outlet to the international market controlled by the TNC, which, as before, are endeavoring to reduce the "periphery" of the capitalist system to the level of agrarian-raw material appendage of its "center". Despite the fact that there is a large underloading of production capacity in the economy of Asian, African and Latin American states and unemployment has become a real disaster, their opportunities for exporting industrial products are extremely limited owing to the policy of the imperialist powers. The proportion of industrial products in the total exports of the bulk of developing countries constitutes from 10 to 20 percent only, raw material commodities, fuel and food accounting for the rest. In addition, the level of taxation of the industrially developed countries on finished products from the developing states is in a number of instances 1.5-2 times higher than the taxes on finished products imported from developed capitalist states.

Thus within the framework of the international division of labor the developing states are acting, as before, primarily the old part of agrarian-raw material appendages of the capitalistically developed world, that is, the qualitatively new trends of their economic development

are in contradiction with the old forms of foreign economic relations which are being imposed on them by international monopoly capital. This cannot fail to give rise to a growth of contradictions. The peoples of the emergent countries are striving increasingly resolutely for an end to the privileged position of the imperialists within the framework of the world capitalist economy and endeavoring to cut off the fabulous profits which the unchecked exploitation of themanpower and the predatory use of the raw material resources of the developing countries are providing for the international monopolies. The epicenter of these demands is shifting increasingly to the sphere of fundamental economic and social problems.

The neocolonialist policy of the TNC, which have concentrated tremendous economic power and very strong levers of political pressure, are confronting the peoples of the developing countries in our time with complex problems. At the end of the 1970's they controlled more than one-half of the production of raw material and the foreign trade and also 40 percent of industrial production in the developing countries.

The TNC are playing the part of strike force in the predatory exploitation of the resources and in the enslavement of these countries. In involving them in the international capitalist division of labor the TNC are putting these countries in the position of producers of relatively simple—labor-intensive and energy- and material-consuming—industrial products. The TNC are sheltering from taxation substantial profits, thereby cutting the budget revenue of the young states. Taking advantage of their monopoly on knowhow and new technology, they are imposing on them discriminatory practices, limiting their rights in the sphere of economic relations, trade, patents and so forth.

As a whole, there were in Asian and African developing countries (where the formation of the proletariat and its organization began later than in Latin America) by the mid-1980's approximately 275 million wage workers. And, furthermore, the present-day working class (primarily the proletariat of manufacturing and extractive industry and transport and construction workers) has more than doubled here in the last three decades.

In many emergent countries it is becoming an increasingly influential social force, which is not only struggling actively for an extension of its rights but also defending the interests of all working strata against the offensive of internal reaction and against the encroachments of the TNC and the endeavor of imperialism to shift the burden of crisis phenomena which have encompassed the world capitalist economy onto the peoples of the former colonies and dependent countries.

The economic crises of the mid-1970's-start of the 1980's inflicted tremendous damage on the developing states, particularly those which are not oil exporters. They made worse the already grave material situation of the working

people. Processes which exacerbated the crisis of employment both in rural localities and in the cities intensified in many of these countries. Despite the increase in the employed population, a trend toward a further growth of unemployment is being manifested here. In the period 1975-1985 alone the total number of wholly or partially unemployed in the "peripheral" regions of the imperialist system almost doubled. The strain on the developing countries' labor market is being intensified by increased migration from rural areas to the cities. The sharply intensified difficulties of these states in various spheres of economic activity led to a cutback in economic development programs which had been mapped out earlier, which could not have failed to have been reflected in the level of employment and the numbers of the unemployed.

The difficult situation which had taken shape in the national economy of Latin American countries by 1984 was portrayed in a report of the UN Economic Commission. Commodity output as a whole here was below the 1980 level. The logical consequence of the decline in production in the period 1981-1983, the report pointed out, was the significant increase in unemployment and partial employment (11). Such also was the situation in Afro-Asian countries, the only difference being that the proportion of unemployed and partially employed among the rural population was higher there. Prospects—given continuation of the former position of the developing countries in the system of imperialism—are just as gloomy and cheerless. Owing to reduced demand for many types of raw material exported from the developing countries, the prices therefor have fallen, and trade conditions for these countries have deteriorated. Simultaneously the developing countries' balance of payments deficits have grown immeasurably owing to the sharp increase in the price of foodstuffs, fertilizer and finished industrial products. All this together with the assertive activity of the IMF and the World Bank, which are creating conditions conducive to the economic and financial expansion of the TNC and the transnational banks in the developing countries, has complicated the situation severely.

Their foreign debt, which amounts to just under \$1 trillion (we would note that back in 1975 this debt was the equivalent of \$200 million), has grown monstrously.

The intolerable conditions in which the developing countries have been placed are giving rise to legitimate anger on the part of the hundreds of millions of people inhabiting them. In their just struggle for genuine independence the peoples of the developing countries enjoy the all-around support of the USSR and the other socialist states. The assistance of the latter is of tremendous significance in the business of surmounting the age-old backwardness, winning economic independence and consolidating the international-political positions of the developing countries. The USSR and the socialist community as a whole are cooperating actively on the

international scene with the nonaligned movement, which unites the majority of developing countries and opposes the imperialist plans for a new world war.

The fundamental, vital interests of the peoples of the emergent countries dictate the need for their joint and coordinated struggle in the world arena for securing national rights, specifically, for the right to independently dispose of their natural resources and for a restructuring of international economic relations on a just and equal basis. Imperialism is unwilling to yield its positions and is employing in order to retain them crude force, flanking maneuvers and dodges of an ideological nature aimed at downplaying the contradictions which exist between the capitalist powers of the West and Asian, African and Latin American countries. However, smoothing over these contradictions is impossible. Relying on the support of their allies—the socialist countries and the working people and working class of the former metropolises and other countries—the peoples of the emergent states are stepping up the struggle for full and completely unlimited independence and social progress.

Lacking opportunities to “eradicate” social conflicts and the national liberation struggle of the peoples, reactionary circles of state-monopoly capitalism placed big hopes in a lessening of the discord and disagreements between the leading capitalist powers.

But in our era these are illusory dreams and a manifestly impracticable utopia. Contrary to the calculations of bourgeois apologists, it is not proving possible in the capitalist system either to avert a growth of interimperialist contradictions or prevent a deepening of the gulf between the ruling circles of the industrially developed capitalist states and the peoples of the emergent countries.

There are few people in the West even who can now deny the exacerbation of crisis phenomena in the world system of imperialism and the intensification of disagreements and fissures within it (13). Nonetheless, a number of Western economists and politicians is trying to portray such processes as something transitory and reversible, as phenomena which are “atypical” of present-day capitalism. Concerning the White House’s superficial attempts to “brush aside” these serious problems, the American commentator Bernard Weinrod wrote with irony in the article “The Reagan Legacy”: “Reaganism, like liberalism in its heyday, promises Americans everything all at once: world leadership, economic growth without feelings of guilt and hard decisions.... To specialists, on the other hand, who speak about limitations, economic contradictions and compromise and a weakening of the United States’ international reputation Reaganism offers the classical American retort: ‘This is all bull...’” (14).

Yet practice is confirming time and again the soundness of Marxist-Leninists’ conclusions concerning the existence of different trends—centripetal and centrifugal—in

the economy and policy of the capitalist states. And, indeed, the profound interimperialist contradictions have prevented international reaction creating a firm common front against the Soviet country which could exterminate the cause of the Great October. This does not mean in various years there have not been attempts at the cohesion of countries of the capitalist world on an anticommunist platform.

However, despite such attempts, contradictions between different groupings of monopoly capital and between individual imperialist powers have clearly been reflected in the world economy and policy.

Discord and struggle between them are inevitable for a number of reasons, primarily owing to the growth of the unevenness of the capitalist countries’ economic and political development. The final decades of the 20th century have been marked, as the 27th CPSU Congress observed, “by new outbursts of *interimperialist contradictions* and the appearance of new forms and manifestations thereof. This group of the contradictions of capitalism has not been removed by class proximity, interest in a unification of forces, military, economic or political integration or the S&T revolution” (15).

The trade wars which erupt from time to time with new force and other manifestations of struggle and clashes of interests among the three main centers of present-day imperialism show graphically that contemporary state-monopoly capitalism has not succeeded in reconciling the differing interests of the ruling classes of, say, the EEC and the United States. In addition, under conditions where the capitalist world in the 1970’s and 1980’s has encountered profound new crisis phenomena and the consequences of the raw material, energy, currency-finance and other crises, the contradictions between imperialist powers have been manifested even more strongly.

Interimperialist rivalry has intensified also in connection with the new phenomena in the sphere of the export of industrial and bank capital, which are now closely connected with the expansion of the TNC. Their international activity in different parts of the capitalist economic system has intensified particularly in recent decades. The TNC have concentrated over one-third of the gross domestic product of the capitalist world, and their share of the gross domestic product of the developed capitalist countries approaches one-half.

The expansion of the TNC is exacerbating capitalist contradictions. It is now developing by virtue of the colossal financial and production possibilities of the TNC based on mass production. Here also conflicts between the TNC and the countries which have become the targets of their activity are inevitable. The TNC are endeavoring to dictate their will to many capitalist and developing states, ignoring national legislation at every step, making predatory use of natural resources, increasing the degree of exploitation of local manpower and so

forth. All this is leading to a weakening of the economic positions of the foreign countries in which the TNC are developing their activity. This is how the internationalization of economic life under the conditions of capitalism, which is exacerbating even further the contradictions of the exploiter system, appears in practice.

As the 27th CPSU Congress observed, "a new knot of contradictions—*between the TNC and the national-state form of the political organization of society*"—has emerged and is being rapidly tightened. "The TNC are undermining the sovereignty of both the developing and developed capitalist countries. They make active use of state-monopoly regulation when it is to their advantage. And come into sharp conflict with it if they discern in the actions of bourgeois governments the least threat to their profits" (17).

The periodic meetings of the heads of state or government of the seven major capitalist countries—the United States, Great Britain, the FRG, France, Italy, Japan and Canada—were brought into being by an endeavor to somehow smooth over the interimperialist contradictions of various levels. However, their results are slight. It is usually ascertained in the course of each such meeting that the approaches of the ruling circles of various countries of the "big seven" to a number of the problems in question do not coincide. In recent years, for example, serious disagreements among them have been caused by the question of the high bank discount rate in the United States. The attempts to formulate at the representative meetings a common position in the face of the growth of contradictions, economic disorders and crisis phenomena in the world capitalist economy have ended in failure. These meetings have demonstrated that even at the highest level, where there is frequently a predilection for declaring intentions to alleviate somewhat the seriousness of the contradictions in the world capitalist system, it has not been possible in practice either to alleviate or, even less, remove them.

As a result of the socialist countries' achievement of military-strategic balance with the NATO bloc states the dissension and disagreements between different factions of the bourgeoisie and between different capitalist powers on the most important political and economic problems have intensified even more. Certain influential figures in the West, including the realistic capitalists and bourgeois politicians in West Europe, are increasingly refusing to obediently follow the lead of the reckless, avowedly militarist policy of the United States. The pronouncements of many press organs of the capitalist countries, which, assessing the reaction in West Europe to Reagan's plans to prepare for "star wars," predicted that this program could exacerbate the disputes between European countries and the United States in respect of most important components of the West's strategy, testify to this.

The consistent peace policy of the Soviet Union and its proposals aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and an all-embracing arms

reduction and limitation agreement enjoy tremendous support throughout the world. And bourgeois politicians cannot ignore this. Each new step of the Soviet Union in this direction increases the disagreements in the aggressive NATO bloc and constricts American imperialism's freedom of maneuver.

In the past the form of settling interimperialist contradictions when they had reached the maximum seriousness were wars. In our time the imperialists are frequently forced to seek other methods of struggle for sales markets and zones of influence. And the reason for this is not least the tremendous social and political changes in the world initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The influence of its consequences on the development of international relations continues to be reflected and also to intensify in our day also.

The processes in the modern contradictory and at the same time interdependent world in the new phase of the S&T revolution, when the arms race unleashed by imperialism continues and the danger of the annihilation of mankind in a nuclear catastrophe remains, imperiously engender the need for new political thinking.

Writing about the restructuring under way in our country, many foreign authors are paying great attention to its significance for the fate of peace. Many acknowledgments that the USSR's foreign policy, which is organically connected with its domestic policy, aims to avert nuclear war may be encountered in the Western press. In this connection Western authors are raising specific questions in connection with which there is a confrontation of various forces in the international arena. Here, for example, is the opinion of a participant in an international London television debate at the end of January 1987: "West Europeans are tired of living in a poison cloud of anti-Sovietism. They want to know the truth about their eastern neighbor" and are making efforts to ensure that Western countries make a "positive response to the Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals." This opinion was shared by other participants in the debate also (18).

Let us also quote a statement by the prominent SPD figure E. Bahr: "Conservative circles are clearly afraid that fear of the Soviet Union might diminish to a certain extent and that a growing number of people will be asking why the West must go on arming.... Gorbachev affords Europe more interesting prospects than Washington is currently admitting. West Europe has an interest in Gorbachev succeeding in implementation of his reform program" (19).

It is well known that on the way toward a nuclear-free world there are considerable obstacles being erected by the forces of militarism.



Reactionary imperialist circles are, as V.I. Lenin observed back at the start of the 1920's, "committing all agitation and propaganda media to increased hatred of the Soviet republic" (20).

Discord and contradictions between bourgeois "Sovietologists" also are intensifying as on the one hand the international authority of the motherland of October increases and its successes grow and, on the other, the general crisis of capitalism deepens and the prestige in the contemporary world of the crude "cult of strength"—the prop of ruling circles of the United States and other imperialist powers—declines. Some of them are now stating that for a number of reasons the crisis of "Sovietology," Anglo-American particularly, which has for a number of decades been imbued with an openly anti-communist spirit, is intensifying increasingly.

The atmosphere is now far less conducive to propaganda of anti-Sovietism than ever before. Whence in many bourgeois press organs an understanding of the fact that the future-oriented decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and CPSU Central Committee plenums set entirely practicable goals. "The West does not cease to be amazed," the West German *NEUE RUHRZEITUNG*, for example, wrote immediately following the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum. "Idle astrologers arguing about the future of the Kremlin may be dismissed." The processes occurring in our country are assessed perfectly realistically, for example, by the American scholar O. Robinson, president of a college in the state of Vermont, who in February 1987 wrote in the *BOSTON GLOBE*: "The Soviet Union is at the early stages of important structural changes.... Gorbachev is a convinced Marxist-Leninist who wishes to prove that the socialist system can work well."

Among the most important factors which are bringing about new failures of the imperialist from-a-position-of-strength policy is the fact that increasingly broad strata of the foreign community are ceasing to believe the anticommunist fables concerning some "military threat" on the part of the USSR. The obvious truth is that the NATO countries spend far more on military purposes than the Warsaw Pact participants. Such conclusions were reached by, inter alia, the American scholar M. Krepon, the author of a book devoted to the dangers of the nuclear arms race and problems of arms control (21). He states with concern that as yet, particularly "in periods of discussion of military budgets, speculation about the Soviet military threat remains a customary phenomenon in U.S. political life.... There is increasingly convincing evidence of the obvious fact that the Reagan administration is using the available data incorrectly, attempting to stoke up assertions concerning the Soviet military threat and using them to undermine the existing arms control agreements and move ahead with work on the SDI program..." (22).

Highly telling blows at the cliches of anticommunism are being struck by the clear, open foreign and domestic policy of the USSR and the measures to realize the

acceleration strategy approved by the 27th CPSU Congress. Contrary to the hopes of the ideological-political adversaries of socialism, the set of these measures leading to the increased efficiency of the Soviet economy and the broader, more comprehensive use of the creative potential of the new social system is geared not to a weakening but, on the contrary, a further strengthening of socialism. The West is beginning to increasingly understand this. "Gorbachev's aim," the American political commentator G. Will, for example, acknowledges, "is to make the system created by Lenin more efficient" (23). Ascertaining this, certain reactionary bourgeois circles are asking: "Is this in the West's interests?"

From the viewpoint of the progressive workers' organizations and the broad spectrum of antiwar, democratic forces the policy line pursued by the Soviet leadership undoubtedly corresponds to the fundamental interests of the working people and the broadest people's masses of the whole world. Developing this thought, the fraternal communist and workers parties view the present restructuring processes in the socialist society as a continuation of the cause of the Great October.

While ascertaining indisputable facts and noting the considerable changes in public opinion in support of the USSR progressive, peaceable circles in the West are at the same time warning not without reason against an underestimation of the serious dangers which could yet be occasioned by the spread (sometimes in somewhat modified forms) of anticommunist cliches and viruses of anti-Sovietism. Thus the leadership of the French Communist Party states with every justification in this connection that the important decisions of Soviet communists and documents of the 27th party congress and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums are putting in a difficult position the forces in the West which have attempted to caricature socialism. For many years governments which have replaced one another and social and political forces which have monopolized the main mass information media have been waging a real ideological war against the socialist countries, particularly against the Soviet Union. The purpose of the organizers of such campaigns is to portray socialism as the "evil empire".

The main danger for anticommunists, the French Marxists conclude, is that "socialism will establish itself in practice as a synonym for freedom, human rights, welfare, full employment, the flowering of the human personality and peace. But for the peoples of the world struggling for their liberation this means, on the contrary, hope and support in their struggle" (24).

Each step en route to the realization of the tasks set by the CPSU is of tremendous international significance. Developing this idea, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: "Tasks of the acceleration and restructuring of socialist society, prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, the demilitarization of

the world and the humanization of international relations constitute the core of the strategic course of the 27th CPSU Congress confirmed and specified by the Central Committee January Plenum.... The party will not depart from its adopted course. Relying on the support of the workers, peasants, intelligentsia and the entire Soviet people, it will decisively, boldly and purposefully continue to abide by this course along the path initiated 70 years ago by the Great October Socialist Revolution" (25). Approaching the glorious October anniversary, the CPSU naturally points to the organic connection of the accomplishments and ideas of the Great October Revolution and today's essentially revolutionary transformations being implemented in different spheres of the life of the socialist society. Particular attention is being paid here to the need for the work to be performed from the standpoints of truth and realism, for the bold revelation of shortcomings and for the working people to be raised to resolute struggle for efficient advance along the path of revolutionary restructuring and for the achievement of the shining, humanitarian goals of the Lenin Party in the sphere of both domestic policy and its international activity.

#### Footnotes

1. "To the Soviet People. CPSU Central Committee Appeal," Moscow, 1987.
2. "Material of the 27th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1986, pp 20-21.
4. For more detail see "The International Workers Movement. Questions of History and Theory," vols 4-8, Moscow, 1980-1985.
5. See, for example, W. Hennings, T. Ronde-Guechtern, "Geopolitik 2000," Stuttgart, 1986, p 160.
6. See "The Working Class in the Modern World," Moscow, 1986, p 151.
7. Calculations of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute (based on official statistics and information of the worker press).
8. For more detail see, for example, "Transnational Corporations and the Working Class," Moscow, 1987, pp 157-165.
9. "Material of the 27th CPSU Congress," pp 17, 135.
11. See "The Crisis in Latin America: Present Situation and Future Outlook," Santiago de Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America, 1984.
13. See M. Smith, "Western Europe and the United States: the Uncertain Alliance," 1984, pp 26, 27; POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, Paris, 1985, No 26, pp 197-244.

14. See also S. Butler, M. Sanera, W.B. Weinrod, "Mandate for Leadership: Continuing the Conservative Revolution," The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp 308-311. K. Oye, R. Lieber, D. Rothchild (eds.) "Eagle Defiant".

15. M.S. Gorbachev, "CPSU Central Committee Report to the 27th Party Congress. Material of the 27th CPSU Congress," Moscow, 1986, p 14.

17. "Material of the 27th CPSU Congress," p 15.

18. See PRAVDA, 6 February 1986.

19. VORWAERTS No 6, 1987, p 28.

20. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 42, p 94.

21. See Michael Krepon (a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). "Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics," Washington, D.C., 1986.

22. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 18 March 1987, p 4.

23. George F. Will, "'Glasnost' Is Just Leninism With a Gorbachevian Gilding," INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 21-22 March 1987, p 6.

24. L'HUMANITE, 10 February 1987.

25. M.S. Gorbachev, "Restructuring—Vital Cause of the People. Speech at 18th USSR Trade Unions Congress, 25 February 1987," Moscow, 1987, p 31.

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#### New Approach to Study of Developing Countries' Problems

18070012c Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed to press 9 Jul 87) pp 77-90

[Article by Viktor Leonidovich Sheynis, doctor of economic sciences, head research fellow of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO: "The Developing Countries and the New Political Thinking"]

[Text] From the editors: this article is of a formulatory nature and for discussion. The author shares his thoughts on the restructuring in the sphere of "third world" research and proposes his approaches to study of the socioeconomic problems of the developing countries. On a number of issues he argues against established propositions, including those which have been expressed in our journal. The editorial office does not share all the author's

*ideas. In future issues we intend publishing articles whose authors adhere to a different understanding of the emergent countries' development prospects.*

Study of current problems of the developing countries in our country has been marked by considerable achievements. A scientific school represented by influential groups and world-class scholars who have prepared at a high professional level studies on individual countries and regions and also innovative works of a general nature has taken shape in two-three decades.

It has to be acknowledged, however, that the most prevalent ideas concerning the situation in the developing countries predominant in the teaching of the social sciences in the VUZ's (not to mention the high school) and in publications addressed to the corps of propagandists and the broad reader are taking shape at a different level. The stream of publications in large production-line editions, as it were, is not neutral in respect of political and even scientific culture. It constantly reproduces one-sided, sometimes simply primitive interpretations of complex problems frequently drawn (with the corresponding references or without), unfortunately, from serious scientific literature in which such opinions appeared either as a result of a reluctance to think the problem through and go beyond the framework of one's "particular," narrow topic or as a kind of "indemnity" by which sometimes an erroneous, but energetically imposed clichéd approach has been paid off, by serious researchers included.

All this has enshrined in the consciousness not only of readers but also writers outdated or primordially fallacious stereotypes allegedly based on "Mont Blancs of facts". Let us not delude ourselves: this is not yet our science's past. Therefore solution of the question by no means amounts to overcoming (or, at least, reducing) the increasing gap between scientific thought and the mass media shaping social consciousness in this sphere and influencing the formulation of political decisions, although this is an important component of the restructuring. Much has to be done in the field of theory also, where there is not only a strict and accurate analysis of actual processes but also many dogmatic prejudices. Innovative political formulations concerning the priority of the interests and values of all mankind over national-state, class, group and so forth interests, concerning the single and interconnected, although contradictory, modern world, concerning the ability "to see the opposite side not as an enemy but as a partner" and concerning the need to solve the problems of the developing countries on the paths of "the constructive, creative interaction of states and peoples on a planetary scale," that is, with regard for the interests of all sides and consensus insofar as mankind's survival has been put in jeopardy, which have become a part of party documents, have not yet been thoroughly comprehended and at times "coexist peacefully" with notions of the past. The rethinking of

our own development and its lessons and tasks, which has begun, also demands a new approach to a large extent to problems of the "third world".

An attempt has been made in the thoughts offered for discussion to specify or, at least, take a fresh look at certain widespread general propositions which are frequently accepted as being axiomatic. The author realizes that the position which he propounds is largely contentious and deliberately emphasizes the debatable assertions. He proceeds, however, from the fact that the philosophical conception of the modern world given at the 27th CPSU Congress presupposes not a partial adjustment but a quite radical revision of a considerable proportion of settled ideas, an emphatic break with "idea-phobia," a broadening of criticism and self-criticism in theory also and a decisive abandonment of the view that a "prohibited zone" of questions which have been conclusively decided and are not debatable—a view which goes back to the wording of somber memory of Stalin's "Letter to the Editorial Office of the Journal PROLETARSKAYA REVOLUTSIYA"—has been preserved.

The difficulties, glaring contradictions and calamities being experienced by the peoples of the developing countries are well known. The nature thereof is linked relatively unequivocally in the bulk of our literature either with the comparatively recent historical past—colonialism—or with their oppressed and unequal, as it is customary to say, position in the system of the world capitalist economy—multilateral dependence inherited from the past and consolidated by contemporary development. Without disregarding either, it is essential to take a closer look at the deeper-seated roots of the current situation, which go back, as a rule, to the precolonial past, but which have not become the property of history alone.

The existing discrepancy between North and South and the developed capitalist and developing countries is the offspring of a complex set of factors, the main ones of which are connected not with the fact that the development of countries of the South was fettered and deformed by outside forces (the impact of these forces was in reality ambivalent and dialectically contradictory and, what is more, produced largely varying results in contact with local structures) but with the fact that economic and social development mechanisms historically took shape in the North which the South had been unable to cultivate—at least by the time when the historical process had become worldwide and had accelerated sharply. It was not so much that the South had been forcibly held back in its development, although braking trends did take place, as that the North forged ahead (2), and, furthermore, no serious calculations confirm that colonial tribute played a decisive part here.

It is not, of course, a question of a rehabilitation of colonialism, whose ledger contains many dark pages, and not of the satisfaction of our historical inquisitiveness per se. At least two important conclusions ensue from an undistorted historical retrospective.

First, an appeal to the past makes it possible to see more distinctly the contemporary contradictions of the domestic development and genuine tragedy of the "third world"—the incapacity of traditional social and political structures, which are being modernized very slowly, for coping with the realities of our age. We are too timid in recognizing the role of socio-cultural traditions in the developing countries and their "contribution" to the mechanism of the braking of socioeconomic modernization. Broad comparisons of a world-historical nature would possibly enable us to look anew at our own problems, although they exist in a fundamentally different context. As far as the developing countries are concerned, the essence of the problem of their backwardness is not what kind of capitalism it was which began to penetrate here back in the times of colonialism but what kind of social environment it is in which it operates and which it has been unable as yet in the majority of developing countries to restructure in its own image and likeness for reasons which are rooted not so much in the immanent contradictions of capitalism as in the properties of this environment itself. It should not be forgotten in representing the historical score of capitalism, which was unable to transform or simply adapt to the given environment, that this is a bilateral process and that the environment also adapts capitalism for its preservation. This was how relations took shape between capitalism and the vestiges of serfdom in Russia of the time of reforms. Much of this departed historical experience is useful for elucidating contemporary problems of the developing countries.

Second, we do not, I believe, fully recognize the responsibility for the difficulties, blocking and various distortions of the development in the "third world" borne by the local social forces which came to replace the colonial authorities. Only the ruling groups and strata which are interpreted as "agents of imperialism," "neocompradors," "capitulationists" and so forth receive a negative assessment. Such assessments have not always been essentially fair and have often been revised (it is sufficient to turn to Soviet historiography of the Indian National Congress and the activity of M. Gandhi and J. Nehru). Besides, it is essential not to lose sight of a highly dangerous phenomenon which has already been revealed (although not in practice investigated) in our scientific press—"reactionary anti-imperialism" (3). Anti-imperialist verbiage is quite popular in the "third world," and it is employed by highly diverse forces: after all, it is far easier to politically mobilize socially undeveloped masses of the population by calling attention not to the causes of their sufferings but to the culprits, real or imaginary.

If the task of expanding the "anti-imperialist front" to the utmost becomes the priority task, we run the risk of orienting ourselves politically toward unity with antidemocratic, antiprogress and simply irresponsible forces, which at times acquire considerable influence or become masters of the situation even in certain developing countries, and of subordinating scientific study to a

vision of the modern, very complex and ambivalent world which has been prescribed in advance and is simplistic and purely dichotomous.

Our ideas concerning the prospects of the developing world are largely determined by the conception of the choice between two development paths—capitalist and noncapitalist—formulated more than 25 years ago. It was assumed at that time that a socialist orientation would make it possible to solve the developing countries' complex problems radically and in a comparatively short time, and that the development of capitalism would encounter practically insurmountable barriers and create ugly and nonviable structures. This view was recorded in the 1961 version of the party program. Actual processes forced a periodic adjustment of these notions. Is it not time to take the next step and recognize that, regardless of our political preferences, on the scale of the "third world," if taken within the boundaries accepted in our country, there are not two equivalent directions of socioeconomic development?

The overwhelming majority of the developing countries has been pulled into the process of capitalist development. Although this development is connected with profound contradictions, as an objective process it has acquired the logic of self-development, and the prospects of the solution of many economic and even social problems—regardless of whether this is declared openly or not—are connected with the capitalist transformation of the economy, which is gathering pace and spreading in breadth and in depth, albeit frequently assuming unaccustomed, "nonclassical" forms. For many countries belonging to the upper echelon of the "third world" the previous formulation concerning the "interruption" of this process and movement "in circumvention" of capitalism has become altogether pointless for the process of capitalist development is quite far advanced.

Countries of a socialist orientation, given the broadest (and manifestly not strict) approach to determination of the composition of this group, account for approximately 7.5 percent of the gross product and 8.5 percent of the population of the developing countries. The majority of them belongs to the "third world's" least developed countries with a devastated economy and acute sociopolitical conflicts. In the majority of cases the noncapitalist path has yet to produce the progress hopes of which were connected with it. There are few countries proceeding along it which could serve as a particularly infectious example. They are essentially confronted with no less seriousness by the same problems as those confronting countries of a similar development level, but different orientation. Finally, in a number of cases the declared orientation toward socialism could be very seriously questioned (as the Syrian communists, for example, have done).

Although the accession to this group of new countries (as, equally, the "departure" of some of them who belong to it now) is not precluded, it has to be acknowledged

that the noncapitalist path on the periphery of the world capitalist system has not become and will hardly become in the foreseeable future an alternative which is of impressive dimensions and sufficiently convincing. And as the processes of restructuring in our country gather momentum, our ideas concerning socialism will probably become increasingly far removed from actual social relations in the majority of developing countries of a socialist orientation. To what extent these countries will in terms of objective conditions be able, and their guiding forces will wish, to evolve in the direction of renewed socialism is a question requiring special discussion.

This does not mean that virtually all former colonies and semi-colonial territories are oriented toward capitalist development. The search for a noncapitalist path is represented here—if the developing world is seen in its real outlines and not divided by a largely artificial boundary dictated more by political and ideological than scientific considerations—primarily by China, Vietnam, Cuba and Albania and only secondarily by Ethiopia, Angola, the PDRY and so forth. Of course, there are certain differences between the “socialist developing countries” and “developing countries of a socialist orientation” connected with the stability of the regimes, place in the systems of world economic relations and so forth, and these differences not only may but also must be a subject of closer analysis. But if we wish to ascertain what is really of most importance, namely, the practicability of a socialist alternative for the economically backward countries with non-European historical and cultural traditions, and also the manifold peripeteias which this alternative undergoes here and a number of regularities seeming at times to be “deformations” of the socialist model, deviations, derangements and so forth, it is essential that we “restore” to the developing world its inalienable and major constituents and conduct a really comprehensive comparative analysis.

The discreteness of studies pertaining to the developing world in its narrow interpretation and countries which with this reservation or omission or the other pertain to the world socialist system cannot be compensated at the primitive level: with the aid of episodic contacts between specialists, familiarization with literature and so forth. Purposeful comprehensive research on an inter-institute basis (inasmuch as leading specialists are administratively separated) by research groups formed specially for this purpose which have drawn up a uniform program and conception of the research would seem absolutely essential.

Given this approach, the socialist alternative also as a version of a solution of the problem of backwardness acquires a truly representative body of population, territory and production potential. The “comparative advantages,” as, equally, the social costs of the two paths, may be studied on a comparable basis. For example, interesting “parallel biographies” of China and India both in the postwar decades and in the colonial era

have been published in the West (4). With an excellent school of India scholars and top China specialists, we are pondering the box of the classification system in which to accommodate India and comparing the process of its development with anyone—from Brazil to Africa—but are for some reason avoiding a study whose heuristic possibilities are exceptionally tantalizing. And the logic whereby Laos pertains to the socialist, but Cambodia, to the developing, countries is quite incomprehensible.

The at first sight technical problem of classification is lighted by highly important theoretical facets since the experience of the socialist countries, both positive and negative, is introduced to a study of the prospect of the entire vast world of backward countries toward the close of the 20th century. It should primarily, of course, be a question of China. The socioeconomic image of this country appears to a large extent different today than at the time of the “cultural revolution,” the “three great red banners” and even earlier, when in the so-called “liberated areas” much which subsequently became the ghastly reality of a great country was undergoing the incubation period. Not only appears but is different, it has to be assumed.

Was everything that happened here from the end of the 1940's through the end of the 1970's merely a version extracted from the “package” of objectively determined, but alternative possibilities which frequently confront each country at pivotal moments of history or was this in its principal features the sole possibility, a period which could not have been avoided? How far will the Chinese leadership go in the pursuit of its new policy? What part in the transition from one to the other is played by such a seemingly chance circumstance as the natural death of the leader, which has led to a cardinal change not only in the decorations but also “rules of the game” in many countries? All these questions, which have a far from indirect relationship to this subject and merit thorough discussion, can only be raised here.

The considerable successes in China's economic development of recent years are, however, incontestable, as, equally, is the alleviation, although, evidently, far from elimination as yet of the social mangle which has bound Chinese society. It is difficult not to connect this with the set of economic reforms, the departure from strictly centralized structures, the return to a number of components of the economic mechanism which until recently were considered the exclusive attribute of capitalist (or, in any event, presocialist, early socialist) forms of production, the revival, albeit of limited dimensions, of the free market, the “opening up” of the economy outside, the attraction of foreign capital to so-called “export zones” and so forth. And in the not-too-distant future symbiotic forms of integration with the developed capitalist economy of Hong Kong and the less developed, but also capitalist economy of Macao will appear; a persistent endeavor to incorporate Taiwan on similar terms is being manifested and so forth.

Were some additional proof required of the inopportune nature and inefficiency of a rigid model oriented toward the maximum organization under centralized control of limited (it is this that is usually seen as a justification for centralization under the conditions of backward countries) resources, a model which was deemed to most approximate the socialist ideal, such proof was presented at the Sixth Vietnam CP Congress in December 1986. We would emphasize that it was a question not only of economic failures (nonfulfillment of plans, irrational use of resources, miscalculations of accelerated industrialization, shortages on the consumer market) but also of such social distortions as social differentiation, corruption, extravagance, bureaucratism and others, which previously were considered the exclusive attendant of the development of society on bourgeois paths.

Only a few developing states remain paladins of the centralized economic model precluding or constricting as much as possible the role of personal initiative and material interest and implanting extra-economic forms of the organization of labor, which in ideologized systems appear under the "moral incentives" pseudonym.

It by no means ensues from what has been said that the socialistically oriented part of the former colonial and semi-colonial world can solve its problems only by drifting toward capitalism. The defects of capitalist production and society are well known. It is generally accepted that capitalist development in the "third world" creates many difficult problems. Even in countries whose economy has developed comparatively successfully in the postwar decades acute crisis phenomena have arisen periodically. The position of many states, on the other hand, located on the lower stories of this world, but which have already been pulled into capitalist development processes, is, as M. S. Gorbachev has rightly observed, not simply alarming but tragic (5).

It would seem useful, however, to formulate in pointed form some of the basic points of departure of a common approach to the contemporary problems and prospects of the developing countries which are already implicit in a number of scientific publications.

First, problems of the "third world" need to be approached soberly. Although a society, having recognized its problems, may, according to K. Marx, "lessen and alleviate its labor pains," it cannot "either leap natural phases of development or abolish the latter by decree" (6). The main economic, social, cultural, political and so forth problems of the developing countries are in scale and by nature such that there is no rapid and comprehensive solution of them on any path of social development. The vast majority of them faces a long and difficult path not allowing in the foreseeable future of economic equalization per the highest or even middle world models (not to mention socio-cultural standardization), and not a search for the magic flint from the well-known fairytale. This is confirmed not only by a

dispassionate analysis of what has occurred in the developing world in the period of independence but also by the entire historical experience of mankind.

Second, state-political delineation between capitalism and socialism in the "third world" is a historical given, whose outlines at the present stage have evidently taken shape, in the main. An aspiration to forcibly drive back socialism is irresponsible and dangerous. But attempts to "urge on" the revolutionary process where the conditions for this are not ripe could also lead to an uncontrollable military-political chain reaction. Nor can the fact that for socialism an expansion of its zone in the backward world could lead to an increase in the already considerable load for the most developed links be overlooked.

Third, the identification of capitalism as such with economic laws of modern production equally mandatory for capitalism and socialism, which is deeply rooted in our country, is theoretically unwarranted and practically futile. K. Marx's well-known thought that "it is only... a vulgar economist who cannot imagine forms which have developed at the heart of the capitalist production mode separate and freed from their antagonistic capitalist nature" (7) is sometimes reproduced (by the supporters of true cost accounting and profit in the socialist economy and so forth), but does not acquire the truly universal interpretation which it merits in the light of all subsequent historical experience. The long period of confrontation of the two systems, the threat of "capitalist restoration" in the first post-October decades, the skeptically guarded attitude toward the convergent hypothesis, certain scientific and political traditions—all this has formed a kind of "detachment complex" hampering an elucidation of common laws and making an absolute of the particular features of a socialism created under extreme conditions.

Fourth, it is essential to see not only the contradictions but also the interdependence in the worldwide economy—a constantly developing organism whose social heterogeneity is just as obvious as is the ambivalence of the ties binding it—commodity, technology, capital and manpower flows and a variety of interweavings of the national economies and international financial institutions. Both are present in our scientific consciousness, but the first in the form of a fundamental precept, the second, more often in the form of reservations. If the proposition concerning a single world, albeit one full of contradictions, is accepted consistently and without compromise, the emphases need to trade places.

All this probably requires a certain adjustment of our ideas concerning also the place of the developing countries in the world economy.

The question of the economic dependence—independence—self-sufficiency of these countries has long occupied a central place in our discussions and engendered

many intricate constructions oriented toward reconciling the popular slogan with reality. Without in the least downplaying the seriousness of the task in the capitalist subsystem of the worldwide economy of the surmounting of particularly dangerous and devastating forms of asymmetrical interdependence for the weaker participants, it is essential to recognize in full measure that the predominant trend will remain integration processes and the intensification of international economic, social, cultural, political and other relations. These processes will develop both between states and by crossing their borders. The zone of state sovereignty will evidently in some respects be gradually limited both by means of international agreements and the very course of things.

The main demand which the accelerated structural reorganizations in the world productive forces are making on their components at both the macro- and microlevels is high adaptability and a capacity for the immediate perception of signals and response and rapid technological, economic and organizational readjustments. Economic independence in the strict sense, on the other hand, should incorporate a certain indifference toward such signals and be based on a stability which actually collides with development tasks.

The objective course of development has confronted the developing countries (in any event, those in which certain prerequisites of economic progress have already taken shape) with quite a drastic choice between the stability and efficiency of production. Stability, a predominant orientation toward the home market protected against outside disturbances and an emphasis on production which affords great independence of the fluctuations of the international marketplace, or efficiency and a search for new, mobile forms of participation in the international division of labor (that is, not simply the invasion of existing markets and the supplanting of competitors but the assimilation and formation of new markets, not only of commodities but also services, and adaptation to the new demands of product quality, supply terms and deadlines and so forth).

The decisions cannot in principle, of course, be compromise only, with a shifting of accents sometimes onto one, sometimes onto another aspect of the problem for it is necessary to navigate the difficult channel between the Scylla of increased dependence on uncontrollable outside forces and the detachment of the efficient sectors of production from the backward economy (which is frequently, although not always, accompanied by a growth of social contrasts and a threat of internal conflicts) and the Charybdis of intensified backwardness and the atrophying of development mechanisms. The decisions cannot be either purely economic or exclusively political. It must not merely be forgotten that it is a question not simply of getting the better of someone's ill will (although there could be an abundance of it) but of the response to the inexorable course of events. It would

seem that the experience of the most developed developing countries will in this sphere be of considerable significance for our country also, and will in any event be due careful study.

On the economic mechanism with which the developing countries alone can tackle the main tasks among those with which they have been objectively confronted by the course of history—the surmounting of and reduction in backwardness—the complex of current conditions makes quite strict demands:

not the creeping spread of the public sector, even if in key branches, which scholars once saw as the criterion, virtually, of a regime's progressiveness, and not even the maximum strengthening of government regulation of all spheres of the economy, but the flexibility of such regulation and its increased purposefulness and efficiency and release from irrational and sometimes simply parasitical components;

the development of self-regulating processes in the economy based on market relations, which should become increasingly all-embracing, and the formation of a competitive mechanism based on the actual economic autonomy of the operating subjects (private property—the individual occurrence thereof) and capable of breaching (with the help of the state or without it) the monopolization of individual spheres of economic activity and causing the rejection of the persistently inefficient components of the economy, in the modern sector in any event;

the keeping "afloat," dictated not so much by economic as social factors, of traditional and intermediate forms of the economy based not so much on a redistribution of national income from the modern sector to the traditional sector (which has in a number of countries acquired impressive dimensions and is consolidating state clientele relations) as on their gradual modernization and prompting onto the path of new nontraditional forms of stimulation and survival;

not the maximum supplanting of foreign enterprise (particularly when it is replaced by local, technologically less efficient enterprise—public or private, it is immaterial) but a flexible selective strategy oriented toward the use of its advantages and recognition that these advantages have to be paid for and that firm and long-term relations may be built not on the basis of confrontation (particularly when it is sharpened for political and ideological reasons) but on a purposeful expansion of the zone of mutual and concurrent, albeit not identical, interests (which does not, of course, preclude the curbing of abuses on both sides).

The above-formulated propositions have already been stated in our scientific literature in this form or the other; an attempt has been made here merely to bring them together and free them from the reservations and limitations emasculating the essence of the matter and



also the one-sided evaluation of the activity of the TNC and the recommendations of the IMF, the World Bank and other international organizations. It is not, of course, a question of the unconditional acceptance of such recommendations—the question can only be decided on the basis of a specific analysis of the situation in the countries to which they are addressed—but of a calm approach to them and an abandonment of the notion that the very social nature of these institutions compels them to put forward plans which are knowingly opposed to the objective interests of development on the periphery of the world capitalist economy (8). If we are to be consistent in recognition of the interconnectedness of the modern world, it is essential to acquire a more balanced view of the economic basis of this interconnectedness—not only the international division of labor but also the institutionalized flows of material and financial resources and information (not reducible to the transfer of capital but incorporating it also).

It is very important to emphasize one further circumstance also. A rapid process of the development of capitalism is really under way in the "third world". But the economic mechanism designated quite generally (and therefore primitively) above is not specifically capitalist or socialist. It is a mechanism adequate to the development of present-day productive forces ambivalent in respect of capitalism and socialism (and also taking account of the specifics of the developing economy and society as far as the traditional sector is concerned).

In drawing up very bold and far-reaching plans for the restructuring of our own economic mechanism we should evidently, as a minimum, refrain from an evaluation of what is occurring in the developing countries and, even more, of recommendations to them from the standpoints of idealization of the economic model from which we ourselves are now endeavoring to depart. Of course, it may be objected to this that we are at a different stage of development and have a more developed economy, that the economic mechanism which took shape in the USSR on the frontier of the 1920's-1930's was at that time not only adequate to contemporary conditions but was also the sole possible mechanism and so forth. The response to such objections, which does not go that far beyond the framework of the subject under discussion, is that the optimal nature of the supercentralized economic and sociopolitical structure, which had become firmly established in the USSR 5 years after the death of V.I. Lenin, was hardly incontestable even for his time and merits serious theoretical discussion not fettered by taboos which are extraneous in respect of scientific study.

In evaluating socioeconomic development on the periphery of the world capitalist economy as a whole we should evidently rid ourselves more decisively of the ideological-theoretical construction of the allegedly constantly intensifying and growing crisis here and development leading to stalemate. Crisis phenomena in the economy

and policy do indeed periodically arise sometimes in one, sometimes in another spot of the "third world," but no society is insured against this. More material is the fact that in the process of development conditions have been created in the majority of cases for the surmounting of serious situations, although a high price has sometimes had to be paid for this. A crisis, that is, the utmost exacerbation and intensity of all social contradictions, lasting dozens of years is a nonsense and devaluation of the concept.

In reality, many phenomena, painful and harsh frequently, which are ranked with the "crisis of capitalist development" in the "third world" concept are a form of this development. The viewpoint that the modern sector has developed here thanks to the degradation of the traditional sector and that for this reason both economic and social disintegration between them are intensifying constantly is widely portrayed in scientific literature. It is maintained that as modernization is increasingly thoroughly transforming certain segments of the economy and society, circumventing or subjecting to merely the most superficial plowing their traditional tracts, the problem of disintegration (and, consequently, further modernization) is becoming increasingly acute. This is a principal argument in support of the proposition that it is merely the "development of underdevelopment" which is occurring in the "third world".

A more balanced and objective approach is further complicated by the fact that this viewpoint is acquiring extensive emotional support in the developing countries themselves, subjugating the imagination of many scholars. Those who do not share it are frequently accused of "elitism" and an "armchair view" of the sufferings of millions of people. Truly, social science loses its active and humanitarian functions if it becomes indifferent to the fate of those who see the destruction of traditional principles and the forced coexistence of the "consumer society" and the "indigent society" as the end of the world. But it has to be considered that the economic mechanism which is capable of securing a real reduction in backwardness in the developing world will, as a rule, constantly distinguish individual components which have proven their highest efficiency (countries, areas, sectors, enterprises and so forth) and frequently also accelerate social contrasts and the disintegration of society.

Both the positive and negative experience of more than 100 developing countries over several decades has evidently nonetheless shown that there is no serious alternative to this economic mechanism, taken in its main features and not in particulars. The attempts, à la Proudhon, to combine the "good" features of one system of production with the same features of another are naive. But the developing societies possess in principle certain opportunities for adjusting spontaneous processes (without setting the utopian goal of eliminating them), opting



for less painful variants and alleviating the contradictions. In addition, the corresponding set of instruments is gradually being developed.

Integration trends are growing in the economy of many developing countries, however great the extent of its disintegration. In the social sphere the process is more complex and contradictory: disintegration here is determined not only by the focal, gradual nature of modernization but also the resistance of the traditional environment. Not in a position to formulate any constructive alternative in the sphere of production, it is stubbornly resisting and at times counterattacking in the sphere of consciousness and social standards and institutions. The capacity of the traditional consciousness for long consolidating its domination of important areas of existence, including economic behavior, is well known.

Nonetheless, disintegration in its modern forms is not only a serious impediment in the way of economic growth and social progress but also an indicator of the renewal of society which has commenced, the reorganization of its structure and the shaping of a social consciousness corresponding to the imperatives of the present day, at least in certain sectors of the social mentality.

No developing society, evidently, will be able to circumvent a historical period of disintegration, but of paramount importance here is the problem of its social costs, the main ones of which, we believe, are connected with a stimulation here of conflict potential. This problem has both a domestic and international aspect.

The conflict nature of domestic development entails a threat to state unity and the integrity of historically inadequately forged social organisms and the extremely undesirable process from many viewpoints of a further comminution of the "third world". Modernization cannot—as the experience of all countries which have switched in the wake of "leaders" from long stagnation to rapid development in any historical era testifies—simultaneously encompass all strata of the population, particularly in large countries. But the rapidity with which all sectors are growing, the modern sector—for technological reasons—and the traditional and marginal sector—as the result of the demographic explosion—makes the situation historically unprecedented and similar on different "stories" of the developing world, although the "traditional" in Latin America and in the East is qualitatively diverse. Frequently individual ethnic and religious groups in the "third world" (the Chinese in Indochina, Sikhs in India and so forth) prove more adaptive to modern processes, and then social disintegration develops into customary forms of ethnic-religious conflicts.

The conflict nature of social development under current "third world" conditions also represents a serious obstacle on the difficult path of the formation and implantation here of democratic structures and institutions of

civil society. It would seem, in our view, that on this problem also we must rid ourselves of certain aberrations and take into consideration the certain reassessment of values which is taking place in our society also following the 27th CPSU Congress. Party documents emphasize that the development of democracy is the sole guarantee of success of the restructuring and the irreversibility of the changes which have begun. We are recognizing with increasing profundity that democracy is not only an instrument contributing to the achievement of this goal of society or the other but also a priority social value in itself. The progressive development of any society also includes the development of democratic institutions and procedures—this is an inalienable component of social progress. Nor are the developing countries outside of this worldwide regularity.

Scholars, both Soviet and foreign, have been unable to get past the fact that the party-parliamentary structures with which many Asian and African countries emerged from beneath colonial oppression and which largely copied Western models have been unable, as a rule, to withstand the first tests and have either been swept away completely or infused with authoritarian content. For some time authoritarian regimes, military or with a populist embellishment, became firmly established in many Latin American countries also. It seemingly followed from all this that Afro-Asian and Latin American societies were either "not ripe" for democracy and would tackle their allegedly more important tasks of national development on the paths of authoritarianism or that some other kind of democracy corresponds to their conditions.

But there is no strict correlation between the level of the socioeconomic development and political organization of society, and democracy, granted the infinite variety of national and socio-historical forms and, specifically, paths toward it, has an invariant nucleus—social initiative and independent activity "from below" and the self-organization of citizens possessing a certain freedom of choice. Truly democratic processes (and not their imitation in forms of "national unity") have in the 1970's-1980's begun to make their presence felt increasingly distinctly in many "third world" countries. Social forces victorious in an election struggle have come to replace authoritarian dictatorships.

Of course, even in the developing countries in which they have come to be established democratic standards and institutions have yet to sink sufficiently strong and firm roots. Development on the basis of a consensus of all politically active forces not going beyond the framework of democratic "rules of the game" as yet lacks a long historical tradition here. Conflict social potential is dangerous primarily in that the contending forces, each of which defends its own interests (and in the majority of cases, its own version of modernization, and not the preservation of social structures), are periodically tempted to commission reserves of support and pressure which easily get completely out of control, paralyze

economic life and the functioning of still infirm democratic institutions, supply trained terrorists, push in the direction of bloody violence and pogroms and provoke the establishment of more or less strict dictatorships, for which a demoralized society pays a monstrous price, losing the democratic, independent institutions in exchange for the restoration of "order".

All this brings us to the broader question of the methods employed in the developing countries by the forces fighting for a change in the socially waning conditions unworthy of man. Social protest, resistance to oppression and struggle against repressive regimes and oligarchical cliques zealously defending their privileges and the total license for means of oppression are not only legitimate and just but are themselves a most important engine of social progress. This proposition is quite elementary, as is, equally, the proposition concerning the preferableness of the peaceful path, which is also not new to Marxists but which was rehabilitated, as it were, at the 20th CPSU Congress.

At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that violence, at times in the most savage forms, is widespread in many developing countries and crosses their borders even. The escalation of violence has its roots both in the complex of present-day socioeconomic conditions and in socio-cultural traditions. The attitude toward the violence perpetrated by rightwing authoritarian or simply cannibalistic (in the direct sense, at times) regimes, as occurred recently in the Central African Republic, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and so forth, is not in question. Violence on the left (in quotation marks or not) is a more complex matter. The approach thereto cannot, evidently, be unequivocal and merits thorough discussion.

However, in all cases it is essential to firmly remember that violence is a very keen and, what is more, double-edged weapon. Reliance on violence has frequently led to the smashing of revolutionary, progressive forces and a lengthy period of suppression of all liberties. But even when a revolutionary party is victorious, it is very important to understand in good time that the center of gravity following the victory shifts to constructive, creative work and not to allow oneself to be carried away by the inertia of violence. We would recall V.I. Lenin, who wrote in the well-known article "The Significance of Gold Now and Following the Complete Victory of Socialism": "For the real revolutionary the greatest danger—perhaps, the sole danger even—is the exaggeration of revolutionary spirit and obliviousness as to the boundaries and conditions of the appropriate and successful application of revolutionary methods.... Whence it follows that the 'great, victorious and world' revolution can and must employ only revolutionary methods? By no means. This is plainly and unreservedly wrong. The fallacy of this is clear as a matter of course on the grounds of purely theoretical propositions, if there is no departure from the soil of Marxism. The fallacy of this is also confirmed by the experience of our revolution."

Finally, the dangers contained in a defense of violence should be evaluated in the light of all of historical experience. Outstanding minds of the last century discerned them and warned against them. "Diabolic rage," F.M. Dostoyevskiy wrote about it, "is capable of growing from local Stavrogin, Verkhovenskiy and Nechayev improvisations into mass parasitical excrescences on the living stem of the liberation movement and distorting the life and development of whole countries. It is dangerous seeing the bloody epic of the "Red Khmers" as an isolated and inimitable episode in the history of a small and backward country, as also to underestimate the danger of the outrages which are perpetrated by the Peruvian organization as if mockingly calling itself "Sendero Luminoso"—"Shining Path". Yesterday, Cambodia, today, Peru. Who can say that such revolutionaries will not constitute a serious threat to society in other developing countries? We emphasize: precisely a threat to the whole of society, in the face of which almost all remaining political differences and delineations recede into the background.

It is not to be expected, of course, that further development will proceed without periodic exacerbations. But under current conditions, when highly efficient means of extermination may be employed, it is important to keep these exacerbations within the bounds of civilized social behavior. And not only because this will facilitate the emergent countries' arrival at the democratic highways of history—any domestic conflict could easily be internationalized.

The question of social conflicts in the "third world," as also relations between socialist, developed capitalist and developing countries, should also be examined in the broader context of a new vision of world problems. It would seem that an important step forward has been taken in the past 2 years both in comprehension of the principle of peaceful coexistence as the main priority of our policy and in its realization in practice. The USSR has shown distinctly that on the decisive question—disarmament and a lowering of the level of military confrontation—it is prepared for very decisive and far-reaching steps.

We also take into consideration the fact that socialist revolution in the developed capitalist countries is a question of, at least, the very distant future and that in the foreseeable future the unity of the world can and will be realized within the framework of the cooperation of different socioeconomic systems. Appreciable changes are occurring also in the communist movement of the developed capitalist countries. The barrier between communist parties (in any event, in the majority of countries in which they have more or less mass support) and social democrats does not seem as insurmountable today as was the case recently even (not to mention the times when the slogan "Rightwing Socialists Are Warmongers" was in circulation).

The most conflict-prone zone remains, perhaps, the "third world," in which the tug of war has repeatedly assumed dramatic and dangerous forms. "...We wish to dispel the West's mistrust. This is not a bluff. It is our principled policy, which we formulated as the result of long and profound reflection and which we affirmed at the country's highest forum," the Soviet leader declared to the British prime minister. It was also said unequivocally that "the Soviet Union recognizes the historical relations between states and regions of the modern world—whether East-West or North-South. It is necessary to improve all these relations" (9).

It is evidently necessary from these standpoints to continue the rethinking which is under way in science of a number of serious problems of world economics and politics. It is necessary for a start to attempt to imagine how there could be movement toward a new world economic order based on a consensus of the main parties concerned. There is an urgent need for a more tranquil and balanced analysis of the totality of relations along North-South lines. Interrelationships here will undoubtedly become increasingly strong and diversified. Our approach cannot, of course, be apologetic but it must also be free of denunciatory predeterminations. It is essential to develop dialectical approaches to the role of the TNC in the "third world" and evaluate certain progressive possibilities contained in the capitalist development of backward countries also.

The forces shaping the North's policy in respect of the South are economically and socially heterogeneous, and their interests are contradictory, and the balance of these forces is changing constantly. All this is frequently either disregarded in our scientific literature or viewed on the basis of individual examples, but has not become the subject of independent analysis. There are in the North influential forces interested in an enhancement of the level of economic development of the South, the solution there of the most urgent social problems and a lessening of the potential for conflict. There are also, of course, aggressive, imperialist forces unwilling to recognize the realities of the modern world, but there is also public opinion condemning the greed and aggressiveness of reactionary, truly imperialist circles and at the same time, on the other hand, the irresponsibility and recklessness of a number of regimes of the South and the violation there of civil rights.

Without abandoning resistance to the aggressive policy of imperialism, it is essential to ascertain and, in addition, actively mold zones of the concurrence of interests of East and West in the South, distinguishing their human component, and to lower the level of confrontation in this zone also. It is important here to consider the sensitivity of the West's public opinion in respect of USSR policy and conflicts provoked by extremist forces in the developing countries.

Anticipating possible objections that the author is propounding pious wishes which fail to take account of

today's political realities, evolved relations and the inertial nature of settled orientations and processes, it is essential to make three concluding observations.

First, the surmounting of the inertia of evolved approaches cannot extend to some spheres and circumvent others. Conservatism and inordinate cautiousness in some spheres of policy, ideology and science could seriously lessen the efficiency of the restructuring which is unfolding in other areas.

Second, a distinguishing feature of the policy begun in April 1985, consolidated by the 27th CPSU Congress and advanced by the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum in 1987 is its long-term, principled nature and orientation toward long-term goals and not the current marketplace and the immediate reactions of our partners. The balanced, realistic policy has already begun to bear fruit. Not only public opinion of the left but also a considerable section of the political establishment of the West is beginning to change its attitude toward our country.

Third, it is essential to make a precise distinction between scientific publications and publications reflecting the official position. For only a comprehensive and uncompromising comparison of different viewpoints in the course of scientific discussion can lead to comprehension of the entire set of problems posed by life.

### Footnotes

1. I. V. Stalin, "Works," vol 13, pp 84-102.
2. "The countries and peoples of the East," the authors of the fundamental Soviet research work rightly emphasize, "found themselves in inauspicious conditions which objectively discriminated against them not only on account of their colonial-dependent position but also owing to their socio-cultural remoteness from the West, which had become the leader of the formational progressive movement." See "Evolution of Oriental Societies: Synthesis of the Traditional and the Modern," Moscow, 1984, p 148.
3. See G. F. Kim, "Soviet Oriental Studies at a New Frontier," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 6, 1986, p 2.
4. See, for example, R. Murphey, "The Outsiders: the Western Experience in India and China," Ann Arbor, 1977; W. Malenbaum, "Modern Economic Growth in India and China: the Comparison Revisited, 1950-1980," ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE No 1, 1982.
5. See PRAVDA, 3 April 1986.
6. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 23, p 10.

7. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 25, pt I, p 426.

8. "Not directly connected with the interests of individual privileged groups in the developing countries, the IMF and the World Bank are frequently more consistent than the local ruling circles both when analyzing the economic difficulties which have confronted the latter in the current decade and when drawing up measures for their solution," state the Soviet experts N. Karagodin and A. Elyanov, who are very far, of course, from an uncritical approach to the activity of these institutions (see MEMO No 2, 1987, p 34).

9. See PRAVDA, 31 March 1987.

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### **Model of 'Information Economy,' Effect on Work Force Viewed**

18070012d Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYI MIR* in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed to press 9 Jul 87) pp 91-102

[Article by Ralf Ivanovich Tsvylev, doctor of economic sciences, leading research associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute and leader of a research group: "On the Threshold of the 21st Century: The Capitalist Information Economy and the Working Class"]

[Text] Much has already been written in our literature about the new phenomena in the economy of present-day capitalism connected with the S&T revolution and the structural reorganization of production. These phenomena and processes are affecting the foundations of capitalist production so profoundly that we may now speak of the emergence virtually of a new model of economic development (a). It is this, incidentally, which is the essence of the structural crisis developing in the United States and other capitalist countries. The model which is taking shape may conditionally be called "a resource-saving model of measured production and consumption". It is substantially different from the traditional industrial forms of production and has its own characteristic features and singularities.

The appearance of the resource-saving model is a qualitatively new leap forward in the intensification of production primarily as a result of the mass consumption in the economy of various types of information resources, which make it possible on a broad front to increase the science-intensity of production and rationalize managerial decisions in the economy. This means that the development of industrial production and its specific manifestation—the model of mass production and consumption—is under capitalist conditions approaching the limit of its possibilities. They are determined by

many inhibitors of both a resource and institutional nature (deterioration in the possibilities of state-monopoly regulation, disturbance of the ecological balance and others) (1). The very functioning of industrial production under capitalist conditions over time assumed a manifestly extravagant nature not only in the sphere of production but in the ultimate consumption of products and services also.

Industrial production with all its costs intensified the social ailments of capitalism even more, leading, in particular, to a growth of social instability, an unhealthy thirst for consumption and so forth. The growth of social and economic contradictions and the exacerbation of competitive struggle in the capitalist countries served as the impetus for a spontaneous quest for new, alternative development routes which might, if not solve, at least, alleviate many of the contradictions of modern capitalism. This quest seemed to the ideologues of capitalism all the more justified in that the achievements of the S&T revolution have produced many new solutions for production problems.

The transition to a new development model will inevitably be accompanied by a new exacerbation of the social and economic contradictions of capitalism. There naturally arises here the question of the extent to which it will be reflected in the position of the working class. This undoubtedly means big and complex problems, the answer to which will require the efforts of many Marxist scholars. This article attempts to touch on just some aspects of these problems.

### **Transition to the New Model**

The start of the transition to the new economic model of capitalist management is connected to a considerable extent with the progressive deterioration in the economic situation in capitalist countries since the 1973-1975 crisis. This process is being accompanied by the painful breakup of many established relations in the social and economic spheres. New systems of state-monopoly regulation with a new distribution of roles between the state and the monopolies are emerging, the system of labor relations is undergoing changes and the nature of the evolved economic mechanism representing a totality of forms, methods and instruments of self-regulation of the process of social production is changing. Soviet scholars have analyzed many processes connected with the structural reorganization of the capitalist economy (2).

The inception of the new model of economic development was brought about to a considerable extent by the fact that the present stage of the S&T revolution had moved to the forefront the information factor in economic processes. At all stages of the design, manufacture and marketing of commodities information is being used increasingly intensively as a particular resource. The sharp increase in its role in social production also reflected profound regularities of the progress of human

knowledge. As studies conducted in the USSR and the West show, the trend of the increased extravagance of man's production activity which has shown through may be overcome only on the paths of the accumulation and increasingly intensive use of scientific and technological information. Some works note, for example, that information will be precisely the resource which makes it possible to overcome the relative limitedness of physical resources (3). We can agree with this assertion since it is information and scientific knowledge which are really becoming the sole means of an absolute reduction in energy, raw material, intermediate product and equipment requirements.

Ultimately real wealth is created by the increasingly growing domination of the mind over the material world. Since people's creative capabilities and inventiveness are unlimited in their development, the possibilities of an increase in real wealth are unlimited also. And merely the nature of the social system can limit the free flight of the human spirit. From these thoughts there by no means follows the conclusion that a quantitative leap forward in the development of science and technology embodied in the information economy will "improve" capitalism. The antisocial essence of capitalism and its extravagance will in one way or another find new forms of manifestation even under the new conditions of the development of the economy, particularly if its militarization continues and the achievements of science and technology are used not for the sake of creation but for purposes of destruction.

The present revolution in the productive forces promises fundamental changes in the established forms of production. Management of production processes is being entrusted to an increasingly large extent not to the people participating in them directly, as was the case previously, but to information stored by people ahead of time (prior to the start of production), which, once incorporated in production, begins to determine such processes to an increasingly great extent. A new type of automation—information automation—is emerging. This applies particularly to industrial robots, whose functioning is based on the receipt and storage of information in feedback circuits. But not only robots. The main components of flexible manufacturing systems—machine tools with numerical programmed control and robots—are integrated in a single whole by interdependent data flows with the aid of computers. This affords an opportunity for the rapid readjustment of such systems to a changing list of products of varying batch production (4).

As distinct from traditional industrial equipment, flexible manufacturing systems function almost totally with the aid of data inputted into them ahead of time and without man's direct participation. "It is necessary to overcome certain traditional ideas, when paramount significance is attached primarily to the material components of production, and to recognize that data materialized in the form of lines of a program on paper or a

display screen is an inalienable component of the production process" (5). This is precisely what we call information automation. It is marked by a qualitatively higher level of automation of production based on the extensive use in designs of the information-process automated equipment itself and also data storage and processing equipment (microprocessors) (b).

Whereas traditional automation was based on the flow-line production method characteristic of the industrial type of production, information automation breaks with the organizational-engineering structure of the evolved production process. In a whole number of cases it makes economically justified an abandonment of line production and a transition to small-series and even individual production with a frequent change in the design of the manufactured products. The differentiation of the latter is brought about primarily by the tougher competitive struggle for consumers. As a result there is a sharp enhancement of the role of the design phase, in which both the costly preproduction preparation of the product and all the necessary modifications thereto are carried out. A solution was found in the extensive use of CAD systems permitting the rapid preparation without additional outlays of the entire necessary documentation for the launching of products in production (c).

It needs to be borne in mind that the economically justified use of flexible manufacturing systems presupposes a fundamental reorganization of the entire production process. In this sense the "information automation" concept should be interpreted broadly. This type of automation envisages the close linkage of all components of the production process on a macroscale also. For example, the computerized processing of material and the manufacture of products, automated design and planning and the control of stocks and the movement of materials are integrated with the aid of computers in a single production system. But things are not confined to the use of information automation in purely production processes. Informationization is in time assuming a universal nature. Rapidly developing information-communications systems based on the use of communications satellites and the operation of national and international computer networks are leading to the appearance of the so-called "information field" phenomenon (d). The "information field" represents the integration of many exponents of information in a single network, which affords people almost instantaneous access to sources of the necessary information. Such access thereto will impart great dynamism to social and production processes for, all other things being equal, the decision-making process in the economy and production will be speeded up.

It should be noted that many information sources are at the present time under the exclusive control of capitalist groupings in the United States and other developed countries and serve as a means of strengthening their political power. The alarm sounded by the broad public in bourgeois countries in connection with the use of the

information-communications systems for surveillance purposes is graphic testimony to this. The "information field" essentially has no geographical boundaries, and the movement of information pays no heed to international borders. Even now the "information field" is assuming global proportions in the capitalist world and is being used actively by the TNC in their mercenary interests.

The said phenomena confirm that considerable changes have appeared in the capitalist economy in the direction of the transition to a new model of economic and S&T development based on the extensive use of information resources. We shall attempt if only briefly to describe its most important features. First, as distinct from the present model of mass production and consumption, an increase in production under the conditions of the functioning of the new model is realized not thanks to the treatment of large amounts of raw material based on traditional, established technology but thanks to the extensive use of both accumulated knowledge and diverse current information given a minimal use of resources.

Second, the properties of this model are such that it points in the direction not of maximum economic growth and extravagant consumption of resources but production of products of the highest possible quality given their minimal quantitative indicators. These particular features thereof are leading to a measured growth rate and measured consumption with the extensive use of renewable types of energy and resources and the maximum development of waste-free processes (they have been illustrated with a varying degree of fullness in Soviet publications and in Western economic literature [8]). The provision of equipment with microprocessor technology is making it less materials-intensive, more compact and less energy-consuming (e). A similar role for the organization of information processes with the minimal consumption of energy and raw material given the maximum output of the product obtained is performed by biotechnology based on the use and regulation of precision production processes at the molecular level. A clear trend had emerged at the end of the 1970's-start of the 1980's in the United States, for example, toward a relative reduction in the consumption of energy, labor resources and certain materials per unit of gross domestic product. All this will obviously contribute in one way or another to a relative diminution in the size of enterprises, a reduction in proportional outlays on constant capital and an increase ultimately in the returns from fixed capital.

Third, the process of production intensification will be effected not so much thanks to economies in the consumption of live labor as thanks to economies in embodied labor. From the viewpoint of the established notions concerning the constant increase in the productivity of live labor this could sound somewhat paradoxical. In the past the basis of the engineering revolution in industrial production was the provision of workmen with the

maximum amount of energy and equipment, whence the sharp increase in labor productivity. Meanwhile the current technical revolution is geared to an increase in "resource productivity" and a reduction in the consumption of direct labor in production itself given a simultaneous growth on the scale of the entire economy of intricate human labor mediated by science and technology. The moment predicted by K. Marx, when the appropriation of a universal productive force and not the directly live labor performed by man becomes the main basis of labor productivity and wealth, is arriving. "Real wealth now appears....," K. Marx observed, "more in the form of the monstrous disproportion between the work time expended and its product, just as in the type of qualitative disproportion between labor reduced to a simple abstraction and the power of the production process which this labor oversees" (10). Whether this "monstrous disproportion" born of modern science will continue to serve capital or whether modern society will take a development route in which there is no longer any place for capital is a fundamental question for the fate of the development of human civilization.

Development is repeated, as it were, but at a higher level. Labor-intensive production is emerging anew, but of a new, transformed type based on the extensive use of particularly complex highly skilled labor, namely, labor which has accumulated scientific knowledge and information to the maximum extent. The labor-intensiveness of the product in the newest sectors in the United States in 1982 producing modern means of communication and electronic components and in instrument making was higher by a factor of 1.3-1.5 than average labor-intensiveness for the entire complex of science-intensive sectors (11). It is well known, for example, that Japanese capitalism aspires to the use of primarily this type of labor—the labor of well-trained disciplined workers (12).

Spontaneous transition to the new development model is increasingly becoming under the influence of the bitter competitive struggle a reality for the United States, Japan and a number of other leading capitalist countries. At the present time information science, that is, the entire activity connected with the accumulation, processing and distribution of information, already serves the entire national economic complex, and, like power engineering and transport, should be attributed to the infrastructure. However, the dialectics of development are such that in time decisive significance in the economy will be attached to the production and the distribution of information and will determine its character and the nature of its functioning. In fact it is a question of the formation of a new type of economy—the information economy. Recent studies show that the number of employed persons connected in one way or another with the accumulation, processing and distribution of information is growing constantly in all the main capitalist countries. The process of the technological integration of telecommunications and computers and the formation of a fundamentally new industrial complex for the processing, storage and distribution of information is accelerating currently (f). There is talk of a "revolution in the

field of communications," the essence of which amounts to the supplanting of transport as the principal means of supporting relations between people by an electronic communications system.

In the near future the complex of science-intensive sectors connected with electronics, biotechnology, telecommunications and computer and semiconductor production will be the pivot around which the production structure of the industrially developed countries will be fundamentally reorganized. All these sectors are becoming the core of the new material-technical basis (g). Obviously, the backward countries in the 21st century will be precisely those which lack the production machinery of the information economy. The presence of such a machinery could impart new impetus to an acceleration of the economic development of the industrial capitalist countries and determine their success in the intensified competitive struggle. Even now the main ones, primarily the TNC based in them, which have succeeded in creating a relatively ramified and efficient system of international production and the exploitation of wage labor (14), are attempting to organize relations with the developing countries on the basis of "information in exchange for raw material". This system of relations is theoretically substantiated in varying form by many bourgeois ideologists and politicians (G. Diebold and P. Drucker in the United States, J. Servan-Schreiber in France and others).

### Fate of the Working Class

The fundamental changes in modern production and the transition to the new development model which have begun will naturally have the most serious social consequences, and they are being reflected even now in the position of the working class. Of course, it is difficult today to foresee the entire intricate complex of such consequences, and only some of them may be mentioned in a short article.

There arises first of all the question of the fate of the working class at the new stage of the development of capitalist production.

The reduction in the proportion of the industrial proletariat in the overall numbers of workers and the slowing of the pace of its absolute growth in a number of capitalist countries in recent decades and also the mass appearance of new specialties and trades not directly connected with industrial production have provided grounds for some bourgeois ideologists to present the updated proposition concerning the alleged inevitable disappearance of the working class (h). For example, D. Bell, the well-known theorist of the "post-industrial society," maintains that the workers as a source of surplus value are now being replaced by knowledge and technological information.

First, the entire fallacy of this proposition is that capital is seen as a self-sufficient force unconnected with the working class which it exploits. The existence and development of capital are inseparable from the existence and development of its traveling companion—the working class. Second, the working class cannot be identified only with the industrial and agricultural proletariat. It should be defined broadly—by way of the inclusion in its composition of new categories of workmen (office workers, specialists and other proletarianized groups of the technical professionals). This on the one hand corresponds to Marx's conception of the proletarian strata of an economically active population deprived of ownership of the means of production and for this reason compelled to appear on the labor market as sellers of manpower. On the other, these categories of employed persons are by the nature of their labor acquiring features of similarity with workers in industry. Thus studies of labor processes conducted in offices show that the majority of workplaces therein are in terms of their functional characteristics "proletarian". The labor operations in them are of a uniform, repetitive nature and prescribed from outside, and the people performing them have no control over them. This office proletariat is highly heterogeneous in terms of skills, age and nature of the work performed. There is also an internal labor market here in the form of a system of in-house preferment (16).

The appearance of the industrial working class characteristic of the era of industrial production is undergoing considerable changes also. Demands on the workers' qualifications are changing rapidly. Specifically, the role of such workmen as repairmen, troubleshooters and operators is being enhanced. The main growth, however, is in the relative significance of the fundamentally new categories of workmen employed to this extent or the other in the processing, storage and transmission of information. In the period 1972-1982 in the United States, for example, the growth in the number of programmers, systems analysts and computer operators constituted, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 138, 200 and 477 percent respectively given an overall growth in the work force in the same period of 26 percent (17). This category of workmen is connected directly with the progress of information automation. They possess high qualifications and enhanced production mobility and are capable without waiting for instructions from above of independently resolving problems which arise. Such qualities of theirs are largely determined by the level of education and general high training. These are essentially a new type of workman which has already acquired a definition in English (knowledge workers). Employing V.I. Lenin's expression, it may be said that the numbers of the "engineering proletariat" are growing.

All these people, the exponents of new intellectual professions and knowledge (excluding top-flight and middle-tier managers), will under the conditions of the capitalist "information economy" be, as before, objects



of capitalist exploitation. The preponderance of brain work in their production activity affords capital an opportunity to create an additional volume of surplus value thanks to the exploitation of labor of higher complexity. Increasingly large profits are now being squeezed by capital from the qualifications, intellectual forces and nervous energy of the workmen, and the exploitation mechanism has become more intricate and subtle.

Naturally, the new categories of workmen need their interests defending. The trade union movement is confronted with the difficult task of enlisting them in union organizations and formulating their specific demands of the employers. Clearly, many methods and approaches cultivated by the union movement in the course of work with the masses of the industrial proletariat will hardly prove useful in work with the new strata of the proletariat, which have a number of distinctive features (a clearly expressed aspiration to promotion up the professional ladder, for example).

The molding of the new type of collective workman is being accompanied by big losses for many workers of the old sectors and trades. The traditional base of the organized workers movement is inexorably being undermined. Strong pressure is being exerted on the unions on the part of the employers for the purpose of changing the strategy and tactics of their behavior. Referring to the complexity of economic development, they are demanding that they display a spirit of "cooperation" and abandon the traditional demands of constant pay increases. The intensified anti-union campaign of the monopolies and the state is evidence of growing social contradictions.

The robotization of production represents a particular danger for workers at capitalist enterprises. Robots are a fundamentally new form of automation. The point being that, as distinct from conventional automatic equipment, robots are designed not to perform a particular function. They are gradually being endowed with capabilities ("seeing," "hearing," "feeling," "moving") which enable them to perform a wide range of production operations and also to be switched easily to various types of operations. Thus, and it is important to emphasize this, the supplanting of workers by robots is occurring not in accordance with the principle of the transfer of the performance of this specific operation or the other to a mechanism but in accordance with the principle of imitation of the intellect and capacity for sensations permitting the replacement in production of many, many categories of workers.

In the estimation of the U.S. United Auto Workers Union, by 1990 the introduction of robots will have reduced the need for workers on the assembly lines in the auto industry by 50 percent. There are even more telling forecasts of the supplanting of live labor in production (the Stanford Institute, for example, predicts virtually the complete automation of manual labor in the United

States by the year 2000 with the loss of millions of jobs). However, the forecasts of mass unemployment should for all that be treated with a certain caution for the labor-saving effect of new equipment is one thing, how the dynamics of employment shape up on the scale of the entire economy, in which many contradictory trends are frequently integrated, is another. Forecasts of unemployment based on a consideration merely of the S&T progress factor suffer, as a rule, from the so-called engineering approach, whereby the potential of technology and people's potential are compared unequivocally. Yet the process of the supplanting of people by machines is a highly complex social process containing a multitude of transitional phases and precluding in many instances a direct and unequivocal comparison of machines and people. The influence of new technology on employment could be manifested via a number of indirect processes such as the relocation of traditional sectors to this region or the other of the developing countries. It is also the case that the introduction of new technology and machinery is geared to the performance of production operations which cannot be performed by people or are performed by them unsatisfactorily. And this not to mention the fact that employment dynamics are influenced by many other factors of general economic significance (prices, consumer demand, demographic factors, methods of the combination of machinery and people, management methods and others).

The thought suggests itself that unemployment will not be of the kind that usually supplements the reserve army of workers who are superfluous compared with capital's average growth needs. Unemployment connected with the structural breakup of production and the appearance of new professions will be mainly of a static nature.

It is now also threatening millions of people employed in office work and the service sector. It should be said that until recently the nonproduction sectors of the capitalist economy and numerous offices were considered a kind of "last resort," where the threat of loss of job was allegedly least. The proposition concerning the "compensatory" role of the service sector was championed particularly zealously by the above-mentioned D. Bell. Indeed, substantial masses of people who had lost their jobs directly in industrial production and agriculture frequently entered offices and the service sector. Now, however, in connection with the rapidly growing automation of labor in offices and the service sector the opportunities for the enlistment of new manpower therein are beginning increasingly to diminish. But even this is not all. In recent years there has been a pronounced intensification in the capitalist countries of the process of the replacement of services by consumer durables (home electrical appliances, PC's, automobiles, television and sound and visual recording equipment). In Great Britain, for example, spending on such commodities grew for a lengthy period (1954-1974) at a faster pace than spending on comparable services (transport, entertainment, consumer services and so forth) (18). The do-it-yourself sphere grew rapidly, as a result of



which there was a constant decline in demand for various chargeable services offered by commercial organizations (repair and construction work and others). Thus in the United States purchases of construction materials by individual homeowners grew so rapidly that by the mid-1970's they had for the first time in the country's history exceeded one-half of their total sales (19).

Whence it is obvious that the compensating influence of the service sector on reduced employment in industry could be reduced to nothing. All this is fraught with a further serious exacerbation of the unemployment problem.

Increasingly great significance is now attached more than ever for the working people to the problem of public control of the use of the new technology under capitalist conditions. It is becoming a subject of political struggle for the vitally important interests of many millions of people are affected here. Involved mainly in a solution thereof are the unions, which are attempting to incorporate in collective bargaining conditions ensuring protection of the workers' rights at the time of introduction of new technology in production. Back in 1979 the British trade unions advanced at their conference a proposal concerning the conclusion with the employers of special agreements on new technology stipulating, inter alia, the unions' participation at all stages of the development and introduction of technology, at the design stage included. Similar demands are being put forward by the unions of other capitalist countries. Their realization could lead to significant changes in the nature of the union movement, primarily to the stimulation of union work among the engineering-technical personnel directly responsible for the development and introduction of the new technology.

### **New Historical Shift in the Structure of the Working Class**

As a result of the changes occurring in the economy the polarization of social forces in the capitalist countries is intensifying considerably. Concentrated increasingly at one pole is the power of monopoly associations disposing of tremendous material and now information resources, at the other, the working masses and various petty bourgeois strata, among whom protest against the domination of the monopoly associations is growing spontaneously.

Under the impact of the new technology a sharp differentiation is occurring in the working class itself. Although the sum total of scientific and technical knowledge employed in the labor process has grown as a whole, it (knowledge) is distributed far from evenly among all the labor functions of capitalist production. On the contrary, its distribution is showing a certain tendency toward polarization between different groups of workers. One manifestation thereof is the erosion which has

begun of the middle, most populous, strata of the proletariat and a strengthening of the positions of the upper, most skilled categories of workers. It is a question in this case of a diminution in the numbers of workers of the mass occupations (milling machine operators, lathe hands, planers and so forth), the majority of whom possess an average skills level. To all appearances, this is the start of the *second historical shift* in the structure of the working class. It may be compared in terms of its significance with the preceding changes in the structure of the working class which occurred at the turn of the century. At that time the relative significance of mass workers of average-qualification occupations, who ultimately undermined the predominant positions in machine production of the craftsman-type highly skilled specialist workers, began to grow rapidly in the composition of the working class as the development of machine production and the mechanization of production processes accelerated. Yet it was this category of highly skilled workers who occupied the key positions in the production process which had been least susceptible to control and pressure on the part of capital. The strikes of these workers usually immediately paralyzed production since their replacement was a highly complex business. This is why enterprise owners readily consented to a restructuring of the production process and its decomposition into individual operations and their subsequent mechanization. All this permitted the creation of a mass stratum of semi-skilled workers. Thus in the period 1870-1930 the proportion of the latter among all workers of the United States' manufacturing industry grew from 38 percent to 55 percent (20). Simultaneously there was a sharp growth in production of the role of foremen and various inspectors. As a result capital's control over the labor process intensified. In addition, the semi-skilled groups of workers were replaced relatively easily, and they reinforced the reserve army of labor.

The application in production of flexible automated systems and robotics is now making the labor of machine operators redundant. Their place is being taken by unskilled and semi-skilled workers keeping an eye on the operation of the flexible systems under the direct leadership of a small group of specialists of the top qualifications (i). At the same time the extensive application of microelectronics and information technology is leading, as a rule, to the comminution of production functions, which is creating conditions for the application of unskilled and semi-skilled labor. ILO studies have shown, for example, that the use of microelectronics in offices has had dual consequences: the demand for top-class specialists capable of tackling organizational tasks has grown, and operations, whose performance has been entrusted to workers without any special training, have been subdivided (22). The same conclusions were reached by the participants in an international comparative study in accordance with the "Labor" project (23). As a whole, it is obviously possible to agree with the conclusion of economists from Stanford University (United States) that "the growth of sectors with progressive technology and the increased consumption of their

products will in all probability lead to reduced demand for skilled workers in the American economy" (24).

The following typical example from contemporary industrial practice may be adduced in corroboration of this proposition. At many enterprises the search for malfunctions in equipment and the subsequent repairs were performed until recently by highly skilled specialist technicians. Now, however, with the rapid spread of automatic testing machines such operations are performed by workers with the most minimal training. Automatic testing machines are employed extensively in telecommunications, for example. According to information of the American Telecommunications Workers Union, thousands of its members have had their pay cut merely as the result of the use of this new technology (25).

It should not, however, be concluded from what has been said that the application of new equipment is leading only to the mass deskilling of workers, as some sociologists and economists of a left persuasion in the United States and other capitalist countries maintain (26). The deskilling process is occurring, as already observed, given the simultaneous formation of a new structure of highly skilled categories of the working class with sound educational training. As distinct from the bulk of workers, they are capable of adapting flexibly to the rapidly changing conditions of present-day intricate production. It is not simply now acquired skills and experience but a capacity for continuously updating and replenishing one's knowledge which is the hallmark of this new stratum of workers. This fact and also the frequently multi-profile nature of the qualifications of these workers or the "polyvalency" of their labor are contributing to their detachment from the mass of workers. They are joining the unions with reluctance and under existing conditions are performing the role of support group of the employers in the exercise of control over the labor process. At the same time, however, this upper stratum of workers also has a certain degree of independence of the employers.

It has to be stressed that the process of differentiation in the structure of the working class under current conditions by no means amounts merely to changes in the correlations of various qualifications of workers employed in industry. It is assuming a broader social nature. Losing their jobs in industry, masses of skilled workers have now been forced to turn to a search for unskilled, auxiliary work in other sectors of the economy. As a result the process of social differentiation is accelerating on the scale of the entire economy. A statement made by the Telecommunications Workers Union at U.S. Congressional hearings in 1983 pointed out that only a small proportion of workers with a high level of education and training would benefit from the introduction of new technology. The lot of the bulk of workers, on the other hand, would by the end of the 20th century be the labor of cleaners, cashiers and kitchen workers (27). And this is hardly an exaggeration. At the

start of the 1980's from 2.2 to 3 million workers who lost their jobs at enterprises of major companies of manufacturing industry had begun work in restaurants and at small, primitive enterprises manufacturing clothing and sporting goods. And, furthermore, the small enterprises, which are based on the use of progressive technology, had attracted only a negligible percentage of those who had lost their jobs (28).

The following conclusions may be drawn from what has been said above. A sharp differentiation is under way in the structure of the working class of the main capitalist countries. Its very structure here is assuming an increasingly "rigid" character with the minimum social mobility within it. A small and quite privileged stratum of highly skilled workers and specialists employed both in industry and in the service sector is being formed within it from scratch. Simultaneously huge masses of semi-skilled workers, who previously had highly paid jobs, but who are now employed in unskilled work, are taking shape within the working class. Accordingly, two labor markets with their own conditions of manpower supply and demand are emerging.

Whereas in the past the masses of semi-skilled workers were a certain connecting link between these two groups of workers, now, with the gradual erosion of the middle stratum, ties between them are weakening even further, and social mobility within the working class is diminishing. Various groups of working people are being "segmented," and favorable grounds for the maneuvers of capital aimed at splitting the workers are being created. A new situation is taking shape in the union movement: the unions are beginning to lose their mass base in the shape of millions of semi-skilled workers, and their structure and activity are corresponding increasingly less to the demands of the "new worker aristocracy," while at the same time, however, the unions themselves must adapt to the needs of millions of unskilled and "marginal" strata of the working class—these casualties of the capitalist use of new technology.

The gradual transition to the new model of economic development of capitalism will be reflected most seriously in the socioeconomic structure of society and the position of various strata and classes, primarily the working class. The very nature of the working class and its role in society at the new stage of the development of capitalist production will undoubtedly undergo appreciable changes. New, more refined forms of exploitation of the "intellectual proletariat" are being introduced in practice everywhere even now. As yet, however, one thing is clear: the new stage of the development of capitalism will not lead to a consolidation of its foundations and will be fraught with a further exacerbation of contradictions and the emergence at the heart of capitalism of new social conflicts, which could shake its very foundations.

#### Footnotes

a. By model of economic development are understood all the changes emerging at pivotal stages of development in

the production process connected primarily with the changes in the technological mode of production, the nature of the use of resources and also with modifications in the process of capital circulation. They determine the general direction of economic development and predetermine particular forms of capitalist management.

1. See G.G. Pirogov, "Capitalism in the Labyrinth of Structural Crisis," RK i SM No 3, 1985.

2. See G.G. Pirogov, Op. cit.; Yu.V. Shishkov, "Some Concepts of Economic Development," RK i SM No 1, 1986; S.M. Menshikov, "Structural Crisis of the Capitalist Economy," KOMMUNIST No 4, 1984; and others.

3. W. Simon, "The Ultimate Resource," Princeton University Press, 1981.

4. See for more detail V.I. Gromeka, "New Stage of Automation," SSHA—EPI No 2, 1984; G.B. Kochetkov, "Flexible Processes and Questions of Management," SSHA—EPI No 1, 1985.

5. V. Vinokurov, K. Zuyev, "Topical Problems of the Development of Computer Technology," KOMMUNIST No 5, 1985, p 23.

b. Like the steam engines in the past, microprocessors are categorized as modern metatechnology with a general and universal application in production. In other words, the combination of microprocessors and any equipment may produce the greatest synergetic result in production.

c. Sales of CAD systems are growing at an unprecedented rate. Thus in 4 years (1976-1980) in the United States annual sales of these systems rose from \$70 million to \$1 billion. It is anticipated that by 1990 this indicator will have passed \$14 billion (6).

6. R. Kaplinsky, "Automation. The Technology and Society," Harlow, 1984, pp 47-49.

d. The "information field" concept was first introduced by the American expert H. Dordick (7).

7. See H. Dordick, "The Network Marketplace," Norwood, New York, 1981.

8. See L.P. Nochevkina, "Intensification of Production and Structure of the Economy in Capitalist Countries," Moscow, 1982; K.-H. Preis, "Ways to Moderation. Strategy for the Future," Moscow, 1984.

e. According to certain estimates, the extensive spread of microelectronic technology could ensure in the near future an increase in the productivity of the existing equipment by a factor of 1.5-2 and a savings of energy by a factor of 4-5, and raw material and intermediate products, of 5-10 (9).

9. SSHA—EPI No 9, 1985, p 36.

10. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 46, part II, p 213.

11. SSHA—EPI No 8, 1986, p 41.

12. L. Franko, "The Threat of Japanese Multinationals. How the West Can Respond," Wiley, New York, 1983.

f. At the start of the 1980's the value of the product of the data processing, storage and distribution sectors in the United States was greater than that of the auto manufacturing product and amounted to 3.3 percent of GNP. A threefold increase in this proportion is anticipated by the mid-1990's (13).

13. SSHA—EPI No 2, 1966, p 44.

g. It would, of course, be wrong to believe that the new production structure is supplanting the traditional economy entirely. New types of production employ in one way or another the production machinery of the traditional economy. Figuratively speaking, grain and coal cannot be transported on laser beams. For this reason transport and many other types of industry will be essential for the normal and continuous functioning of the new sectors of industry.

14. See R.I. Tsvylev, "The TNC: System of International Exploitation of Wage Labor," RK i SM No 4, 1985.

h. For example, the American economist W. Leontieff maintains that the same thing will happen with the workers as a result of S&T progress as once happened with horses and other draft livestock in agriculture as a result of its mechanization (15).

15. See MEMO No 10, 1985, p 56.

16. R. Crompton and G. Jones, "White-Collar Proletariat. Deskilling and Gender in Clerical Work," London, 1984.

17. "Impact of Robots and Computers on the Work Force of the 1980's". Hearings Before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and the Economy of the Committee on Small Business. House of Representatives, 98th Congress 1st Session, Washington, May 17 and 18 1983, p 156.

18. J. Gershunsky, "Social Innovation and Division of Labor," Oxford University Press, 1983, p 17.

19. A. Toffler, "The Third Wave," New York, 1981, p 272.

20. A. Edwards, "Comparative Occupational Statistics for the US, 1870 to 1940," Washington, 1943, Table 9.

i. The flexible automated system installed in 1983 at an enterprise of the American General Electric corporation led to the jobs of 68 skilled lathe operators being replaced by the labor of 8 unskilled workers (21).

21. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW No 1, 1984, p 96.

22. D. Werneke, "Microelectronics in Office Jobs," ILO, Geneva, 1983.

23. RK i SM No 5, 1986, p 172.

24. "Impact of Robots and Computers....," p 203.

25. Ibid., p 206.

26. H. Braverman, "Labor and Monopoly Capital," New York, 1974.

27. "Impact of Robots and Computers....," pp 203-204.

28. INTERNATIONAL LABOR REVIEW, September-October, 1984, p 560.

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**Aganbegyan Heads Group of Soviet Academicians Visiting Italy**

18070012e Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS*  
*SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87  
(signed to press 9 Jul 87) pp 124-128

[Article by Aleksandr Abramovich Galkin, doctor of historical sciences, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute: "Italian-Soviet Dialogue: Trends and Prospects"]

[Excerpts] A group of Soviet scholars headed by Academician A. G. Aganbegyan visited Italy in the spring of 1987. Together with leaders of the Economics Branch this group included representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute and Central Economic-Mathematical Institute. The Soviet scholars participated in scientific conferences and symposiums in Rome, Milan, Naples and other cities and addressed mass audiences. They met figures of political parties and labor unions, activists of the "Italy-USSR" Association, university lecturers and students and prominent economists and sociologists.

The range of problems discussed at the meetings of Italian and Soviet experts was quite extensive.

Thus in the crowded, most spacious hall of Sapienza University, in which hundreds of graduates, undergraduates and lecturers of the Italian capital had assembled, the papers of Academician A.G. Aganbegyan and T.T.

Timofeyev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, devoted to most important economic and social aspects of the strategy of acceleration outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress and the role of the human factor in the renewal processes in different spheres of socialist society were received with great attention.

Such problems as the interrelationship between the CPSU's domestic policy and the international activity of the Soviet state, the role of the working masses and their organization in the restructuring and the development of worker self-management also were at the center of attention in the Center for the Study of Economic Policy, in the General Italian Confederation of Labor and at meetings with activists of the workers movement in Latina, Naples and other cities.

At the Milan symposium the main place in the debate was occupied by questions of economic theory. The main topics of the Italian-Soviet meeting of scholars organized by Naples University and the Social Sciences Faculty of the Institute for Study of Eastern Countries were the Soviet economic reform and its consequences; international economic development trends; the role of the Soviet Union in the world economy and the possibilities of an expansion of its trade and economic relations with capitalist states, including Italy.

Prior to the trip to Italy my colleagues who had been there previously had told me of the big interest which Italians were displaying in what is taking place in our country. Our press had written about this also. Nonetheless, the direct perception of this phenomenon proved very powerful.

The intensifying interest in events in the USSR is manifestly on the increase. This viewpoint is supported, specifically, by many Italians, and there is, it seems to me, sufficient reason for it. It is obvious, in any event, that strong additional impetus was imparted to this process by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January (1987) Plenum. They broke down the wall of mistrust in the information received from our country which had been erected by psychological warfare specialists hostile toward it, transatlantic primarily. People capable of thinking for themselves are convinced that the changes occurring in the Soviet Union are not a propaganda trick designed to "blunt the vigilance" of the Western community and prompt it to forgo its security, as titled "experts" in Soviet policy maintain, but a serious process of renewal intended to ensure a better life for Soviet people and establish higher models of social organization and social justice, and in international policy, accomplish the building of a nuclear-free secure world.

The approach of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution is undoubtedly of considerable significance for the stimulation of interest in all that is connected with the Soviet Union. Italy's leftwing circles have always been profoundly respectful toward

this outstanding event of most recent times and its lessons and significance for the process of social transformations throughout the world.

Signs of increased interest in what is happening in the USSR were manifested at all levels. To convince oneself of this it was sufficient to open a newspaper of any persuasion. A cursory glance, and one immediately comes across information from Moscow. According to some estimates, the amount of such information has increased on average two-threefold since the January Plenum. Nor has television lagged behind the newspapers. Moscow news, which had previously been an infrequent visitor there, occupied (or, at least, occupied during our visit to the country) if not first, then a very prominent place. Interesting phenomena of a semantic nature have emerged also. "Perestroika," "glasnost"—Italian journalists preferred to transcribe these meaningful words (these concepts have become a part of other languages of the world also, incidentally). They are now employed both in scientific treatises and in everyday speech.

The conversations in any auditorium, regardless of the announced topic, began with questions about the restructuring in the USSR and usually ended with them. As distinct from earlier times here, all these questions were, so to speak, apropos: concerning the direction of further economic transformations, the degree of feasibility of realization of the outlined plans, the sources of the financing of the economic transformations, their possible social consequences, the strength of the resistance to the changes which are under way and the sources and exponents of such resistance. But the inquiries were amicable, there being a sincere endeavor to learn the truth. As we saw for ourselves once again, candor was valued particularly highly here. Honest discussion and the absence of diplomatic evasions and attempts to avoid giving an answer were perceived by the audience as the best evidence of the changes which have occurred in the Soviet Union and yet further convincing testimony in support of the restructuring. Specifically, the people with whom we talked made repeated mention of the great significance for their understanding of the problems confronting the Soviet Union and the strategy of reforms and the entire policy of an acceleration of socioeconomic development which it is pursuing of the speeches of Academician A.G. Aganbegyan, which were distinguished by realistic analysis, straightforwardness and candor.

The exchange of opinions concerning the development of international relations was particularly interesting. Just a few years ago even such a discussion would have proven difficult. Of course, at that time also there were many people in Italy who were positive in their evaluation of the aims of Soviet policy and who supported our peace initiatives. Nonetheless (as sociological polls, in particular, showed), considerable numbers of the Italian public had a prejudiced attitude toward the USSR's

foreign policy actions. The concept of the "equal responsibility" of the two superpowers was prevalent, in circles of the left included. In other words, blame for the tension in international relations, for the arms race and for the increased threat of nuclear war was laid both on the United States and the USSR. I did not see the result of new polls on this subject, perhaps because there have been none as yet. Nonetheless, guided only by my personal impressions, I would venture to maintain that there has been a pronounced change in the Italian public's mood in this sphere. The position occupied by the Soviet Union on fundamental questions of world politics is recognized by a vast proportion of Italians.

The meetings with PCI activists afforded us many pleasant hours. It is no secret that many disagreements had arisen between us in past years. They did not concern basic values but their mere existence left a negative impression. All the more gratifying was it to sense that time and the practical work of both the CPSU and the PCI had removed many contentious issues. Wherever I met Italian communists—Milan or Naples, Rome or Aquila—I sensed active support for the renewal process taking place in the Soviet Union, sympathy with Soviet communists pursuing the restructuring policy and a desire for the Soviet people's success. I believe that my colleagues felt the same. For our part, we were understanding with regard to the difficult problems which have to be tackled by the PCI and expressed the sincere hope that the Italian working class and its vanguard party find answers to the questions which have been raised by life itself and reach new frontiers.

We should not, of course, in ascertaining the positive changes in the mood of the Italian public deceive ourselves. We could not fail, for example, to notice that despite the increased interest in all that is happening in the Soviet Union, Italians' knowledgeability about how specifically problems are being tackled in our country, which measures have already been adopted and which are under discussion remains approximate. Soviet publications in Italian arrive in the country late and are frequently confined to an exposition of official material. They are dull and uninteresting, as a rule, in their reports on the debate under way in our country. The language barrier prevents familiarization of Italians with material published in Russian. In view of this many people, including scholars and politicians, are turning to sources in English, primarily American, which is prevalent here. They derive from them not only information but frequently opinion also. Specifically, the proposition foisted on all Western countries by American rightwing circles according to which the policy of restructuring being pursued in the Soviet Union will most likely be short-lived inasmuch as it has few supporters in the USSR was taken from American sources. The anxious questions which were put repeatedly to the members of our delegation testified that such a proposition had made an impression on some Italians.

It is important to bear in mind also the fact that the opponents of the growing mutual understanding between

our countries both in Italy itself and beyond have not laid down their arms. They are regrouping their forces, rearming and bringing up new ideological ammunition, preparing to switch to the offensive. In the United States and in France it is already under way in the form of the active spread of spy mania. In what clothing the propaganda offensive in Italy will be garbed, time will tell.

There were among those whom we met in Italy not only PCI figures but also representatives of the business world. To some extent this was explained by the theme of the symposiums in which our delegation participated. In Milan, for example, the problem of comparing the market and planned economies was discussed, in Naples, questions of the development of the world economy and the restructuring of the banking system, and so forth. At the center of attention here were various aspects of the USSR's economic development and the influence of this development on world trade. Naturally, interest in these discussions was displayed not only by economic theorists (the well-known scholars Prof Luigi Pazinetti, G. Siro Lombardini, Augusto Grazziani, Domenico Nuti and others were active participants in the symposiums) but also representatives of important financial institutions and industrial firms. Some of these institutes and firms (Commercial Bank and the FATA firm, for example) participated in the financing of the symposiums.

But what was most important was not, of course, simply the interest in the scientific meetings. Specialists in the field of the world economy have noted repeatedly recently the particular flexibility and business acumen displayed by the "modernizing faction" of Italian capital. There are many explanations for this phenomenon. It is believed, for example, that Italy, which had lagged behind in economic development, has had to catch up with competitors which had pulled ahead under more difficult conditions than those for the latter. Whence the "better conditioning" and special training of representatives of Italian capital and their enhanced go-getting capacity. Attention was called to the fact that throughout the postwar decades Italian capital repeatedly came face to face with a powerful, well organized workers movement which had, in addition, strong political positions. This taught capital greater circumspection and cautiousness and cultivated in it an aspiration to constant search for new ways of self-realization and the opportune creation of reserves. Many people said it was this which explained the fact that Italy succeeded in passing the first stage of the technological restructuring not only more rapidly than its competitor-partners but also with fewer social costs.

Whatever the case, the upper stratum of Italian business has proven far less susceptible to euphoria occasioned by the market upturn than the big capital of many other industrially developed capitalist countries. It was from the mouths of the representatives of big capital of Italy, both financial and industrial, that we heard the most guardedly realistic and anxiously critical evaluation of

the prospects of the capitalist countries' economic development in the coming years. This evaluation has also given rise to Italian capital's particular interest in capacious new sales markets.

Given such circumstances, it is understandable why the interest in the Soviet economy's development prospects was for Italy's financiers and industrialists not only of a theoretical but also particularly practical nature. A number of Italian firms has already accumulated rich experience of business relations with the Soviet Union. Despite the difficulties, the blame for which lies not only with the Italians, this experience has been positive on the whole. Italy's industrial-financial circles are fully aware that the reforms being carried out in the USSR, including the change in the organizational form of foreign trade, and the practice of the creation of joint ventures afford an additional opportunity for the development of business relations with us. And they are fully resolved not to let it slip.

During the meetings of Academician A.G. Aganbegyan and T.T. Timofeyev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with leading figures of the biggest Italian banks this position was expounded candidly and precisely by the latter. A number of proposals capable of imparting a specific nature to the positive shift in economic relations between our countries was formulated preliminarily. Simultaneously a desire was expressed for a continuation of contacts at the scientific level in order for there to be an opportunity for the opportune evaluation both of the new prospects and the difficulties which could be encountered en route to their realization.

Of course, the real burgeoning of economic relations is possible only when both partners are interested therein. How do things stand in this case? What is our attitude toward Italy as an economic partner? Of course, the final say belongs to the departments concerned and foreign trade specialists. Nonetheless, I have my viewpoint, which I would like to set forth candidly.

Our country now purchases many industrial commodities in Italy. However, full use has not yet been made of existing potential. The trite idea of Italy as a country trudging along in the rear of technological development is still current in places in our country. We should abandon such notions.

Perhaps in the time of a comparatively short trip we were unable to see all that much. But what we did see appeared highly promising. The enterprises which we visited were of the highest standard. This applies both to their equipment and the nature of the product which they manufacture. It would seem that both technologically and in terms of quality of finish many types of Italian products are not inferior to the West German, British and French products which we acquire currently.

Considering the favorable climate for the development of trade with us which is currently taking shape in Italy, this lends its goods particularly high competitiveness.

There naturally arises in this connection the question of balanced trade or, in other words, an expansion of our exports. This problem was the subject of lively discussion both at the symposiums and in the course of meetings. In particular, the people we spoke with called our attention to the fact that Italy has adopted a policy of satisfying its energy requirements without the construction of nuclear power stations, mainly thanks to gas. In accordance with this orientation, a comprehensive gas-distribution system is being created in the country, primarily in the north—in Lombardy. The opinion as to the expediency of Italy's extensive use of Soviet gas was expressed.

It is obvious, however, that building trade policy on the basis predominantly of exports of energy raw material is inexpedient and unprofitable. The exports of such a great power as ours should be balanced, with a preponderance of industrial products. True, the Italian side displayed no particular enthusiasm in this respect. Competition on the domestic Italian market is now of an extremely hardened nature. And some people contemplate the prospect of the appearance thereon of Soviet-made goods with alarm. Nonetheless, it is obvious that, given mutual willingness and vigorous efforts, commodity niches suitable for filling in with our products could be found in this market.

The exchange of information with Italian colleagues at the symposiums in Milan, Naples and Rome convincingly confirmed once again how fruitful scientific contacts are, particularly if they are made in an atmosphere of candor. The Italian participants in the symposiums told us that they would go home with a feeling of time having been spent usefully and enriched with new knowledge. We may with every justification attest the same.

Not all, perhaps, but, in any event, many of the papers presented by our Italian colleagues at the symposiums were distinguished by high professionalism and a deep penetration of the essence of the object in question. This could [text of original breaks off at this point]

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### **Book on History, Theory of French Left-Radicalism Reviewed**

18070012f Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS* 1  
*SOVREMENNY MİR* in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87  
(signed to press 9 Jul 87) pp 180-183

[Ye. M. Kozhokin review of book by S. G. Ayvazova, "Levyi radikalizm v ideyno-politicheskoy zhizni Frantsii, 1958-1981" [Left Radicalism in France's Ideological-Political Life, 1958-1981], Moscow, "Nauka," 1986, pp 149.: "Left-Radical Utopia: Comprehension of a Phenomenon"]

[Text] The revolutionary movement never has been, and hardly ever will be, entirely homogenous and guided solely by strictly scientific doctrine. Not to mention the fact that its social constituents garb their interests and ideas concerning them in various ideological forms, the emotional charge of the revolutionary movement itself (can a revolution without an explosion of passions be imagined!) engenders utopian and romantic aspirations. As the history of recent times shows, utopia and revolution mutually engender one another—in the sense that utopia is impossible without revolution, and, probably, revolution is impossible without utopia.

In the course of the revolutionary process utopia is usually overcome: sometimes as a result of "removal," sometimes, annihilation. But if in the controversy with utopia "realism" gains an unconditional victory, does not such a victory contain the grain of a Thermidorean degeneration of the "realist" victor? The question of the attitude toward utopia and utopists generally becomes particularly acute at pivotal, critical moments of history, when not only its ideological meaning but also socio-psychological substantiveness and even general humanitarian significance are manifested and it is transformed (objectively) into the problem of the compatibility of people proceeding along different paths toward a single goal or into a problem of the preservation (or loss) of the goal itself on this path or the other toward it.

One of the largest utopian movements in the 20th century has been the movement of the "new left" or radical left, as it has frequently been called in the Catholic West European countries. Several conceptions or, more precisely, interpretations of this phenomenon have taken shape in our scientific (and quasi-scientific) literature.

The first, which, incidentally, it is hardly legitimate designating by the delicate scientific word of "interpretation," is distinguished by wholesale censure of the leftists: certain authors (without taking the trouble to reflect on the sincerity of the young radicals, the actual complexities of the revolutionary reorganization of the world or on providing their compatriot readers with undistorted information) saw left radicalism merely as a new subject for articles and dissertations. This approach engendered the corresponding, highly premature product.

The second conception (interpretation) belongs to sincere and honest people who, worried about the purity of moral ideals and the preservation of world culture, discerned in the "new left" new barbarians encroaching on all the spiritual values of human civilization (but not bourgeois society). But this was an aberration of research vision born sometimes of the deep-lying "back-to-the-soil" sentiments of these authors, sometimes a disposition toward undifferentiated anti-Westernism, sometimes both.

Finally, the trend of an objective political and sociological analysis of left radicalism, to which the monograph in question of S.G. Ayvazova\* pertains, developed. Within the framework of this tradition the monograph occupies a special place, and its innovativeness is primarily the fact that we have before us the first *specific-historical* study of left radicalism in Marxist literature.

The book consists of three chapters representing quite autonomous semantic units. The first is devoted to the problem of the conversion of left radicalism from a current of social thought into a political formation. The second, the constituting of radical left theory and its evolution roughly from 1968 through 1981. The third chapter, the most heterogeneous, treats predominantly the forms of the varying existence of left radicalism, for example, its impact on the frame of mind of the participants in the "new social movements" and so forth.

The composition of the book corresponds to its conception and the specifics of the historical vision of the author, who gravitates toward an analytical description; a singularity of the latter is the absence of rigid definitions. The author frequently allows the reader the opportunity, as it were, to himself formulate the conclusions to which, however, he has been led, for which he has been prepared and which remain only to be adopted and expressed. S.G. Ayvazova does not lay claim to broad theoretical generalizations, however, we have before us a historian working in accordance with the contemporary demands on empirical research, that is, not shunning either sociological approaches or the formulation of acute theoretical and political problems. There are no places in the book where the narrative has been interrupted to the benefit of logical noncontradictoriness: it continues even in instances where the facts lead, seemingly, to places other than was wished.

As befits a historian, the author distances herself from the subject of her research. This separation is intellectually difficult, all the more difficult in this case in that left radicalism has by no means become the property of the past. But a dependable position of objectivity is ensured and a tranquil tone and balanced style of exposition are hereby achieved. And these are important merits if it is considered that many people who have opted for the viewpoint of detached observer when describing left radicalism have not managed to avoid bias. Thus verbal extremism has been taken for totalitarian propensities, a sincere aspiration to change has too hastily been declared political recklessness and the coating has been confused with the essence.

Entirely traditionally, S.G. Ayvazova's study begins with an examination of the sources of French left radicalism, which, she believes, was for the first time defined as an independent phenomenon in the period of national crisis at the end of the 1950's. Anger at the policy of the socialists, who had proven incapable of ending the colonial war in Algeria, and a certain dissatisfaction with the Communist Party, which had not always managed to

find effective means of combating this war, engendered in part of the left intellectuals and the students a desire to turn to a search for new organizational forms and the formulation of a different action program.

The Autonomous Socialist Party and armed underground groupings among the students emerged.

But nor did the end of the war in Algeria lead to a decline in radical left sentiments. The United Socialist Party (USP)—the organization of the left intellectual vanguard—was formed in 1960 on the basis of the Autonomous Socialist Party, the "Union of the Socialist Left," which incorporated mainly the supporters of P. Mendes-France from republican left circles, and the "Tribune of Communism" (a group of former PCF members).

Having formulated the "revolutionary reformism" idea, USP theorists charted therein ways to transform the state-monopoly structures of Gaullist France. They proceeded from the fact that the conditions of highly developed, automated production engendered by the S&T revolution would lead to the formation of a "new working class" (engineers, technicians, highly skilled workers), whose system of requirements would incorporate an aspiration to production independence, a recognition of the purpose and aims of production and control over it. They placed particular hopes in this working class; at the same time, however, the workers movement was to have striven for profound structural reforms in alliance with the technocracy, securing "a reduction in the power of private monopoly capital, national and foreign"—a proposition insisted on particularly by the reformist, technocratic-left wing of the USP, which endured up to the 1970's. Despite all this, this party of intellectuals proved incapable of practical action. The impetus to mass action was obtained from other political formations.

The events of the spring of 1968 began with protests of the gauchists: various leftist formations: anarchists, Maoists, Trotskyites showed up on the "crest of the wave," replacing one another in turn. The logical and convincing exposition of these events in the book was blurred somewhat owing to the fact that for reasons beyond her control S.G. Ayvazova was not emboldened sufficiently to call the Maoists Maoists. The initiated reader can guess from the context who are the people in question, the uninitiated will remain ignorant as to what kind of odd variety of gauchism it was "which represented a certain mixture of anarchism and a misunderstood 'Guevarism' and a number of additional interspersions" (p 38).

The Black and Red and 22 March Movement anarchist groupings declared bourgeois and overturned all social restrictions. Capable to the greatest extent of spontaneous action, they opened the floodgates of discontent, but were unable to control the flow. In addition, the cult of spontaneity and symbolic violence could not have attracted the masses, even the students, for long.



The giant wave of May strikes of the working class put on the agenda questions entirely different from student examinations. For a short time the Maoists were in the forefront among the students. Having long urged "merger with the working class," these parvenu "Marxist-Leninists" called for the seizure of industrial enterprises and direct and unremitting confrontation with the authorities and the employers. But the call for the armed struggle of unarmed masses could not have been either understood or supported. The political star of the French Maoists began to wane rapidly. The transition of some of them to terrorist tactics at the start of the 1970's brought about the final disintegration of this movement. The moral potential of May 1968 was incompatible with terror; while transforming French political culture, left radicalism was at the same time itself subordinate to its traditions, in which terrorism was in no wise inscribed.

The gravitation of part of French youth toward revolutionary action, given disenchantment with anarchism and Maoism, turned its attention for some time in the direction of Trotskyite ideas. The Trotskyites were favorably distinguished from the anarchists in that they advocated a strong revolutionary organization. In addition, despite all their dogmatism, they knew how to latch onto certain ideas of the current moment. Nonetheless, they are primarily permanent opponents of the Communist Party and exist in the shadow, as it were, of the PCF; as soon as the shadow diminishes for this reason or the other, the Trotskyites altogether lose the point of their existence. Throughout the 1970's they failed to become an in any way real political force.

Constant disintegration became the form of existence of the gauchist groups. This trend affected in the 1970's the USP also, whose technocratic-left wing headed by M. Rocard, first secretary of the party, joined the renewed Socialist Party; the remainder of the USP dissolved itself to a large extent in the "new social movements".

The history of political action of the leftists does not coincide with the history of radical left theoretical thought. The theorists have not joined a single gauchist organization and laid no claim to practical leadership. J.-P. Sartre, A. Gortz and K. Kastoriadis attempted to look into the future and from the viewpoint of the future judge the present. The author of the book dwells in particular detail on the ideas of A. Gortz—the key figure in French left radicalism and the idol of many of West Europe's extreme left. A. Gortz picked up on the rush into the unknown which painted in so unexpected colors the student revolt of 1968, theoretically generalized the utopian slogans and imparted to them a logical certainty. Beginning with the 1973 work "Critique of the Division of Labor," he embarked on a quest for a qualitatively new model of development of Western civilization. He declared the global inhumanity of S&T progress; accordingly, he conceived of revolution not as the ascent to a higher, consequently, technically more refined mode of

production but as the transition to fundamentally different development tracks. The teaching concerning a fundamentally anti-institutional party, self-management and direct democracy as the sole possible means of the elimination of the hierarchical organization of society was shaped in accordance with these basic postulates.

Analyzing A. Gortz, S.G. Ayvazova is the first Soviet scholar to call attention to the profound transformation of left radicalism in the mid-1970's, when a transition from an anarcho-libertarian to a liberal-libertarian utopia was effected. The idea concerning the paths to the ideal changed, as did the value reference points. Indeed, nothing is impossible in theoretical constructions—the radical left combined its old libertarian utopia with liberal-type realism. "Defense of individual sovereignty," the "minimal state," "expansion of the area of freedom"—these are the values which yesterday's revolutionists began to uphold. In its liberal-libertarian hypostasis left radicalism corresponds to the sentiments of many people who have nothing in common with the degrading groups of gauchists. Thus the militant antistatism of the radical left has been transmitted to many participants in the feminist and, particularly, ecology and antinuclear movements. The socialists of the Rocard current are in the wake of the radical left propagandizing and practicing social experimentation.

The Rocard current, which was formed in the PSF in 1979, incidentally, is given a considered, balanced description in the book. The author distinguishes in the program proposals of Rocard and his supporters two integral components: outlines of economic transformations worked out in a liberal key and outlines of social reforms conceived in a libertarian spirit, given reliance on the "civil society," the new social movements and "social experiments" (p 135).

The book is brought to a logical conclusion by the section on the critical dialogue which the French communists are conducting with the radical left. While not abandoning a tactical alliance with their extreme left opponents, the communists reject the total antiscientism of the radical left and its calls for the breakup of civilization. At the same time, however, they recognize that economic growth cannot be an end in itself. While noting the significance of the radical left's proposition concerning the need for a rebirth of civilian society the communists are opposed to the dismantling of its long evolved structures: unions, parties. In their plan for a self-managing socialist society they assign the democratic state, parties, unions and local self-governing authorities the appropriate place.

Marxists in our day proceed in their theoretical quest from the fact that the movement away from utopia toward science is not an eternal fait accompli and does not amount to the revolution which occurred in the mid-19th century. This movement is perfected time and again, and this is a guarantee of the vitality of Marxism

as a scientific theory. Comprehension of utopian phenomena is a most essential business and part of the colossal collective labor on reactualization of the theoretical equipment. S.G. Ayvazova's book fittingly serves an objective evaluation of the positive and negative aspects of the radical left utopia.

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**Book Views West European Social Democratic Parties, Ideology**

18070012g Moscow *RABOCHIY KASS I SOVREMENNY MIR* in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87 (signed to press 9 Jul 87) pp 183-187

[M. I. Fedorov review of book by M. A. Neymark, "Zapadnoyevorpeyskiy sotsial-reformizm i ideologicheskaya borba" [West European Social Reformism and the Ideological Struggle], Moscow, "Nauka," 1986, pp 352.: "Ideological-Political Character of Contemporary Social Democracy"]

[Text] Among the studies of recent years on social democracy the book by M. A. Neymark, a leading specialist of the USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute in this field, is distinguished by the very extensive, multidimensional coverage of social democratic subject matter purposefully analyzed in the light of the complex ideological struggle in the world arena as a whole and in the workers movement itself in particular.

In scrupulous, reference evaluations of social democracy as a reformist direction in the workers movement: its general ideological and political principles and also views on this theoretical issue or the other, as, equally, the corresponding practical actions closely affecting the interests of the working people of capitalist countries, the author starts from the approaches and ideas which have become firmly established—mainly as of the latter half of the 1970's and in the 1980's—in studies of the majority of our worker experts. He develops and extends these approaches and ideas, specifies them and underpins them with additional information and considerations; in this sense his book is a summary work, which at a sound scientific level brings together and synthesizes the views on a number of important, essential aspects of the theory and practice of social democracy elaborated previously, predominantly in group monographs of the International Workers Movement Institute (1). But the work is by no means confined to this; the author goes much further than a simple "summation".

First, his study makes a critical examination of the concepts of social democracy pertaining to problems which have as yet been broached rarely in this connection in domestic literature and only in the example of individual parties or cursorily, in passing. This applies

primarily to the interpretation by different currents of social democracy (in recent years) of the crisis development of the capitalist economy and also to their positions on the question on ways out of the crisis (chapters II and III respectively in the work in question).

Second, we are dealing as a whole with a new type of study compared with earlier works: in those the corresponding problems were illustrated predominantly from a country angle, and the summary historical-theoretical chapters containing elements of comparative analysis served more as a methodological "tuning fork" in accordance with which the country sections were tuned. As far as the work in question, however, is concerned, such a broad-based, in-depth, integral and truly *problem-solving-comparative* study rich in ideas and observations of both "old" and "new" problems of social democratic subject matter has been undertaken therein for the first time, perhaps—and in this also I see innovation and scientific merit—and, what is more, the center of gravity of the analysis has been transferred to a study of the social democracy of the mid-1980's. We are given a very full picture of the processes and phenomena characterizing the development of the philosophical principles, changes in the political strategy and tactics and turnabouts in the political course of the majority of West European parties of the Socialist International over 15-20 years. The consistently sustained comparative-analysis approach made it possible not only to map out but also "ink in" and in many cases thickly "shade" the contours of the intrinsically common panorama of the ideological and political life of the social democratic parties.

In other words, the "mosaic" of usually self-contained country studies has been replaced by a logically and historically unified "large block," which makes it possible to study more integrally and with a concentrated view and not one dispersed among the motley "color range" of the analytical spectrum what present social democracy represents, see its unity in its diversity, understand the reasons for the considerable influence of this political force among the working people of the capitalist world and grasp what links social reformism with bourgeois ideology and policy and what is simultaneously making it a factor of political everyday life acceptable to quite broad strata of the working class showing a preference for the social democrats.

Third and finally, the monograph attempts to compare in the broadest range—with regard for the dynamics of the 1980's—the fundamental positions of the social democrats and the communists and in the course of this comparative analysis to ascertain the roots and elucidate in differentiated manner the boundaries—and they are dissimilar in different trends of social democracy—of its nonacceptance of the views and policy of its "enemy allies". While trenchantly criticizing the simplistic notions on this score which are still held in our country at times, particularly in propaganda publications, the author characterizes objectively and in nuanced manner

the by no means unequivocal attitude of social democracy toward the theory and practice of the communist party and real socialism. It makes sense dwelling in more detail here on these questions since among the topics which are most acute and prepared by the author in innovative fashion pertain primarily precisely those studied in Chapter IV—on social reformist anticommunism.

The essence of the author's interpretation of this problem is, in short, that although social democracy "rejects the fundamental principles of scientific socialism" (p 194), nonetheless, first, it is not legitimate "to wholly and completely identify the anticommunist doctrines and the corresponding policy of imperialism with the anticommunist tendencies and, at times, actions of social democracy" and, second, its anticommunism is by no means a uniform and invariable system of views and practice (ibid.). The procedural aspect of the interpretation of the question is fundamentally important and most interesting in this chapter. We would emphasize that taking fundamental Leninist procedural propositions on this score as a basis, the author examines here not simply the empirically given ideological-political differentiation of social democracy but primarily the differentiation of anticommunism as a phenomenon, and in correlation, furthermore, with the diversity of factors of dynamic historical reality. It is the diversity and dynamism of these factors, generally speaking, which objectively predetermine the need for communists' and Marxists' differentiated approach to ideological-political currents which outwardly come, seemingly, from one and the same platform, from anticommunist and, in any event, noncommunist positions, the author writes.

This formulation of the question is an important prerequisite of ascertainment of the specifics of social reformist anticommunism, which is "tightly interwoven in the fabric of the philosophical and ideological principles of social democracy, which differ appreciably from bourgeois ideology" (p 197), however closely connected they are with it. It follows from this, incidentally, that in the workers movement, of which social democracy is a part, anticommunism objectively represents a fundamentally alien principle—in both the class-political and ideological planes. Oriented toward the mass base of social democracy, social reformism must in one way or another correspond to its frame of mind and it really in one way or another "appeals to socialism," "does not forswear it" and sees it as a "particular system of values counterposed—albeit at the theoretical level—to bourgeois-reformist, not to mention conservative, tendencies and views" (p 198). The "confessed" views may here to this extent or the other (may not be also) counterposed to communist, Marxist principles, views and political positions. However, what is most important becomes apparent from what has been said above: even while adhering to an anticommunist (or "noncommunist") policy, social democracy preserves a certain "democratic and antimonopoly potential" (ibid.); it strives—and not unsuccessfully—to satisfy the immediate needs of the working

people by resorting to current, albeit the most limited, reforms, and sometimes ventures attempts at radical transformations capable in the long term of affecting the bases of the capitalist system.

In connection with the analysis of the specifics of social reformist anticommunism M.A. Neymark observes that even if in practical policy social reformist and imperialist anticommunism sometimes come into contact both at the ideological level and at the level of the everyday consciousness, nonetheless "even under the difficult conditions of interparty rivalry with social democracy communists endeavor to differentiate between ambivalent versions of anticommunism, seeing this as an essential prerequisite for the establishment and development of mutual relations with social democrats" (p 214). It is further, in addition to all else, as the book emphasizes, a question of the fact that the anticommunism of the "crusaders" of imperialist reaction is ultimately always directed against social democracy also.

M.A. Neymark discloses the ideological-political sources of social democratic anticommunism and in this connection, in particular, traces the historical evolution of the tactical methods with which monopoly capital contributes by its policy to the "reproduction" of social democracy's anticommunism. Both the very idea of this linkage and the disclosure of this connection in the book are marked by innovation. The very is, I believe, also a pioneer where he analyzes the very structure of social reformist anticommunism. The book articulates and describes (largely in a new way) thoroughly and with an explanation of area "originality" its essential components. The ideological component: a philosophical antithesis to scientific socialism, devotion to ideological pluralism, a misinterpretation of Marxist-Leninist teaching on social revolution and a notion concerning the self-liquidation of capitalism by way of an "accumulation of reforms"—combined with a painful response to the growth of the communist movement. The political component: focus of the strategy and tactics of the socialist and social democratic parties on the weakening and "softening" of the communist movement in the capitalist countries, the undermining of its internationalist principles ("new internationalism") and a strengthening of their own influence in the working class connected with attempts to social democratize the communist movement.

The texturally concentrated elucidation of the dialectics of the correlation of both types of anticommunism, whose individual points of contact do not alter the placement of the boundary posts separating them, is virtually the strongest aspect of the monograph from the research viewpoint. The dialectical approach is also reflected distinctly upon the analysis of a problem which is relatively ticklish and delicate in this context—social democracy's attitude toward real socialism.

On the one hand there is the nonacceptance of real socialism or distorted interpretation of its experience recorded in the program documents and prevalent

among a significant proportion of social democracy. It frequently leads to attacks on real socialism and to anti-Sovietism with its characteristic counterposing of "free democracy" to "one-party state communism"; identification of real socialism with "state capitalism"; and the prejudiced likening of the political system of socialism to dictatorial regimes (the basis thereof is the fallacious "political pluralism—totalitarianism" antithesis. It proceeds from the abstract understanding of democracy and freedom which has been inherent in social democracy for almost three-quarters of a century now—we would recall if only K. Kautsky with his book "Democracy or Dictatorship" of sorry renown, which appeared shortly after the victory of October). Such a negative-critical attitude toward real socialism reflects, aside from all else, the practical incapacity of social democracy itself to realize its own program goals—to build "democratic socialism" (p 239).

On the other, the changes which have come to light in recent decades connected with a deepening understanding of the importance of constructive dialogue, more, cooperation, with the socialist community countries, particularly in the international sphere, on questions of detente and disarmament signify "a certain weakening of social reformist anticommunism" (p 241).

A distinguishing feature of the analysis both in this and in the final two chapters which follow it is the appeal to history, which in many respects considerably bolsters the author's line of reasoning. Thus studying the current situation in the sphere of unitary processes, M.A. Neymark frequently turns to the experience of the 1920's-1930's—both positive and negative—and traces the uneven development of the relations of the two detachments of the workers movement: "ebbs and flows, achievements and setbacks" (p 280). But, of course, what is most important in the analysis of unitary processes is the ascertainment of the profound objective interdependence between the struggle for unity and the need for Marxist criticism of social reformist ideology and policy.

Being geared toward practical embodiment, such criticism is a most important component of the struggle to overcome the split in the workers movement. Chapter VI ("Communists and Criticism of Social Reformism"), which presents virtually the entire "chromatic range" of the communist parties' positions in respect of the social democratic parties—both theoretically and in the sphere of actual political action—is devoted to this aspect of the topic. It is shown here how the communists are conducting a tireless, purposeful *constructively critical struggle* against social reformism (p 294), guided by an endeavor to remove the obstacles which social democracy is erecting in the face of the workers movement in its rebuff of the pressure of the monopolies; how the communist parties, for example, are explaining to the masses the connection of the arms race and the mercenary interests of the military-industrial complex; and so forth (see p 294 and the appendix). On the other hand, in its policy

in respect of the communist parties social democracy is adopting at every step *destructively critical* tendencies, demanding ideological concessions from the communists (see p 297).

The final chapter assesses the contribution of social democracy to the improvement in the international situation in the 1970's, on the frontier of the 1970's-1980's and also in the mid-1980's, when it did much and continues to do much for a solution of the question of an end to the arms race and for the relaxation of international tension. Social democracy's positions are illustrated in their evolution as of the end of the 1940's; the phases of the antimissile movement are shown and the growth of anti-NATO sentiments both in the masses and in the upper strata of social democracy, the growth of opposition to the American missile plans, the protest against suicidal nuclear projects, the efforts to create nuclear-free zones, the struggle against chemical weapons, the nonacceptance of the notorious SDI and much else are traced in Socialist International documents. As a whole, the evolution of the social democrats' positions on a number of key questions of war and peace is, as the author rightly establishes, contributing to the rapprochement of different detachments of the workers movement, primarily the socialists and communists, and broadening the antiwar potential of progressive forces, which are capable of preventing nuclear catastrophe.

The high overall scientific level of the study is largely brought about by the systematic enlistment and in-depth analysis therein of material and most diverse sources and the thoroughness of the author's immersion in the world of ideas and practical policy reflected in one way or another in newspaper publications, in ad hoc speeches, in correspondence, in interviews and in declarations, resolutions, programs and such. M.A. Neymark also extracts arguments for corroboration and proof of the thoughts expressed from the words of social democratic periodicals and the information of minutes and reports of various national assemblies of social democratic and communist parties and also congresses of the Socialist International (right up to the last one—1986); the author quotes abundantly and always appositely both program, fundamental documents of social democracy and speeches of prominent figures thereof representing various currents of the social democratic movement. In a word, in the source-study plane the work makes a strong impression: it can be seen that the author has most carefully assembled at "first hand" and studied thoroughly a vast amount of information; it was this, strictly speaking, which enabled him to develop the book's conceptual outlines and to impart to them due convincingness.

I shall not overlook shortcomings of the book. The least successful, in my opinion, is the first chapter, and here is why. Although the task of the study, as stated at the start thereof, "is to ascertain... the basis of the *intrinsic unity* (my italics—M.F.) of social democracy with all its inherent contradictory properties and qualities" (p 11), it is

mainly a question, for all that, of currents, schools and groupings (right, center, left and so forth). The author studies primarily "a mosaic... of opposite ideological components," "ideological assortment," the variegated "spectrum of philosophical positions" and such (p 13). The existence, figuratively speaking, of "multistructure" in social democratic doctrine nonetheless does not, it seems to us, eliminate its true essence, and this essence does not in the least amount to a multiplicity of views. The author himself, speaking about the PSF, for example, establishes that while changing their programs, the ideologists of social democracy "leave virtually untouched the essential basis of social reformist doctrine" (p 16). However, inasmuch as the chapter nonetheless begins with a description of the ideological "multicolor" of social democratism (and a considerable part thereof is devoted to the establishment of this aspect, what is more), to that extent it is the "essential basis" which is willy-nilly moved somewhere "backstage".

It is possible, however, that the author did not wish to reproduce what had already been researched previously by a group of scholars of the International Workers Movement Institute, of which he himself was a member. But one way or another, the chapter appears chaotic. The section "Structure and Functions of Ideology" speaks of the organizational structure of the SPD as an "open party" (p 17), of "political fronts," of the organizational-political forms of the PSF (p 18), of its "brittle electoral body" (p 19)... We encounter here arguments concerning the "strategic focus" of the policy line of the workers party in general (how, for all that, do matters stand with regard to the "structure of ideology"?), singularities of the "functions of social democracy in the workers movement" (which is not the equivalent of the "functions of the ideology" of social democracy)....

The main omission, in my view, is the book's lack of a historiographical introduction. I discovered the sole historiographical insertion on page 50 only.

The abundance in certain places in the book of overly complicated (pp 30, 83 and elsewhere) and sometimes manifestly illogical wording (p 41), editing-stylistic lapses like the fact that the "midwife" of the CERES left-socialist current was Guy Mollet (p 32), which are sometimes encountered, and, finally, inaccurate or imprecise methods of expression of an idea call attention to themselves. Thus, the author writes that "the neosocialism concept... was aimed at the distortion (my italics—M.F.) of the nature of the interrelationships of private-monopoly capital and the capitalist state" (p 63). It transpires that the creators of this concept right from the outset set the goal not of understanding (even in their own way!) but distorting this nature. What, then, was the point of embarking upon a scientific polemic with it? Clarifying definitions in respect of individual politicians are probably required in places (on page 81, for example). Finally, it is incomprehensible how a book which is

so full of scientific matter, personalities and geographical names was published without being provided with either a glossary or indexes. How often have we spoken of the necessity for such auxiliary material in any sizable publication!

These critical remarks do not detract from what is most important in the evaluation of the work: M.A. Neymark's monograph is a serious, original and consolidated study contributing much that is new to our ideas concerning social democracy and the prospects of the struggle for unity of the workers movement.

### Footnotes

1. See "Social Democratic and Bourgeois Reformism in the System of State-Monopoly Capitalism," Moscow, 1980; "Delineations and Shifts in Social Reformism. Critical Analysis of Left Currents in West European Social Democracy," Moscow, 1983; "Social Reformism and the Working People. Mutual Relations of the Social Democratic Parties and the Unions and Modern Democratic Movements in West Europe," Moscow, 1986; and others.

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### Book Refutes 'Myth' of Social Peace Under Monopoly Capitalism

18070012h Moscow *RABOCHIY KLAS* 1  
*SOVREMENNYI MIR* in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 87  
(signed to press 9 Jul 87) pp 190-191

[A.A. Pavlenko review of book by V. F. Kolomiitsev, "Monopolii i rabochiy klass: mif o sotsialnom mire i deystvitel'nost'" [The Monopolies and the Working Class: Myth of Social Peace and Reality], Moscow, Profizdat, 1985, pp 216]

[Text] Class struggle is organically inherent in the capitalist world. What does "social peace" therein mean?

This, in any event, is not only some people's goal, albeit unattainable, but also a social myth—ideological education (in this case, that employed by the bourgeoisie in its own interests, against the proletariat and its allies), which, like any, even the most fantastic, myth, derives certain elements of its content from reality. At the present stage of the development of the productive forces, the socialization of production and labor and the development of the general crisis of capitalism the class struggle of the proletariat has become more complex. The world has changed, the working class has changed and state-monopoly capitalism has perfected its strategy of adaptation. Under these conditions the myth of "social peace" is constructed—by bourgeois ideologists and politicians—from standpoints primarily of the defense of present-day capitalism. Precisely this is the purpose of

the bourgeois concepts of the "deproletarianization" and "disappearance" of the working class, which has allegedly become a "middle class" and is no longer the subject of the revolutionary transformation of society, as was the case previously. The same myth may, on the other hand, be constructed from the standpoints of "social criticism" merging with criticism of the working class. Both approaches have in the theoretical respect a "common denominator"—a distorted interpretation of the changes which are taking place—and in the practical-policy plane are aimed at undermining the process of consolidation of forces of the workers movement.

It can be seen from what has been said how justified the angle of approach chosen by the author of the book in question\* is: after all, debunking the "social peace" myth and revealing here the "mainsprings" of social myth-making means at the same time showing both reality and the place of the myth therein or, more precisely, in the ideological and sociopolitical struggle developing therein.

In V.F. Kolomiitsev's book the working class is viewed in a broad aspect, primarily from the viewpoint of the ascertainment of its revolutionary potential. The author comprehensively analyzes the state of the workers movement and the class struggle (its singularities, forms, main trends and its fruitfulness) in the highly developed capitalist countries at the current stage.

Endeavoring to reduce to nothing the economic and social gains made by the working people as a result of persistent class struggle in the 1960's-1970's, at the start of the 1980's monopoly capital switched to the counter-offensive. The TNC are restoring archaic forms of capitalist exploitation and pursuing a hardline antiworker policy: refusing to recognize unions and to engage in collective bargaining, punishing participation in strikes with dismissal and so forth. The reverse side of S&T progress under capitalist conditions has become the growth of industrial injury and occupational disease. Direct taxation swallows up from one-fourth to one-third of the working people's income (p 29). Mass unemployment has in the developed capitalist countries exceeded 10 percent of the able-bodied population and, according to OECD forecasts, will continue to grow.

A principal place in the book is assigned questions of the proletariat's struggle against the system of capitalist exploitation, the sources of its revolutionary character and the main directions of the formation and development of the working class as the subject of the revolutionary transformation of society; the tremendous difficulties which the proletariat is encountering in the process of accomplishment of its world-historical mission are revealed also. The book shows that the working class' consciousness is influenced not only by the socialist but also bourgeois, petty bourgeois, social reformist, religious and other ideologies.

The corporations, transnational included, are impeding in every possible way the growth of the organization of the proletariat. The state and the monopolists frequently prohibit the creation of unions at enterprises or, if they have been created, endeavor to bring them under their control or, if it is a question of unions adhering to consistently class-based positions, to limit and infringe their rights in every possible way, persecute the union leaders, resort to giant penalties and the suppression of strikes and seek to ban and disband the unions. An unconcealed war is being waged against the unions in a number of countries; the monopolies are using all weapons: strike-breaking, the incitement of national discord between local and foreign workers, mass dismissals, judicial hounding, police repression and so forth. Some monopolies are creating "yellowdog unions" and their own police at the enterprises (pp 81-86).

As a result the numbers of union members in the highly developed capitalist countries is not great: their proportion among workers constitutes little more than 30 percent. In some countries the number of workers organized in unions is declining both absolutely and relatively (in the United States, for example). Nonetheless, overcoming incredible difficulties, the working class in many countries is gradually achieving a rise in the level of its organization. A big part here is being played by the communist and workers parties. The author traces step by step how in the 1970's unitary trends strengthened in the workers and, particularly, international trade union movement in the atmosphere of intensification of the contradictions of capitalist society and the change in the social climate in Western countries connected therewith.

Operating hand in hand with the communist parties, militant, class-based unions, the author points out, are the spokesmen for and defenders of the interests of the working people and are organizing their joint struggle against the national and international monopolies, for economic and social rights and for full employment, pay increases and an improvement in work and living conditions. They are advocating democratic nationalization, the establishment of democratic control over enterprise activity, increased taxes on monopoly profits, a reduction in military spending, an enhancement of the role of the working class in social and political life and the achievement of the unity of the workers movement. Not only the progressive, class-based but also the reformist unions are as the contradictions in capitalist society intensify paying ever increasing attention to political questions.

A significant place in the book is occupied by an examination of mass democratic movements—in defense of peace, for preservation of the environment and national equality, against racism and neo-Nazism and others. The author emphasizes that the working class is moving into the position of most active fighter for peace. The role of the communist and workers parties in the organization

of the struggle for the preservation of peace is extraordinarily important; the unions have contributed their forms of struggle—strikes, picketing, boycotts and so forth—to the antiwar movement.

The book assembles a wealth of factual material, but it is not always used in full to draw inferences. A more frequent comparison of the situation in different countries would have been desirable. The organization of the material leaves much to be desired in places. There are certain instances of imprecise wording.

V.F. Kolomiitsev's book is of a popular-scientific nature and is aimed at a broad readership. It could be used by international affairs lecturers in propaganda work and also by VUZ lecturers when conducting courses in the theory of the world revolutionary process and history of the workers and communist movement. Although a number of works of an area-study nature reveal the position and role of the working class no less thoroughly, the author succeeds in finding his own, distinctive, approach to certain problems of the workers movement. This applies specifically to the important question of the correlation of the role of the workers and democratic movements in the struggle for peace. Available literature has as yet studied this problem insufficiently.

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KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR No 4, 1987**  
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#### **Publication Data**

English title: THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CON-  
TEMPORARY WORLD

Russian title: RABOCHIY CLASS I SOVREMENNYY  
MIR

Editor: I.K. Pantin

Publishing house: Izdatelstvo "Progress"

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: July-August 1987

Signed to press: 9 July 1987

Copies: 9,901

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1987

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